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Sequencing strategically: wage negotiations under oligopoly

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  • Banerji, A.
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Journal of Industrial Organization.

    Volume (Year): 20 (2002)
    Issue (Month): 7 (September)
    Pages: 1037-1058

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:20:y:2002:i:7:p:1037-1058

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505551

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    1. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 252, David K. Levine.
    2. De Fraja, Giovanni, 1993. "Staggered vs. synchronised wage setting in oligopoly," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 1507-1522, December.
    3. Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 2010. "A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, 1: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs," Levine's Working Paper Archive 397, David K. Levine.
    4. Cramton, Peter C & Tracy, Joseph S, 1992. "Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 100-121, March.
    5. Dixon, Huw David, 1988. "Unions, Oligopoly and the Natural Range of Employment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(393), pages 1127-47, December.
    6. Jun, Byoung Heon, 1989. "Non-cooperative Bargaining and Union Formation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(1), pages 59-76, January.
    7. Fernandez, Raquel & Glazer, Jacob, 1991. "Striking for a Bargain between Two Completely Informed Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 240-52, March.
    8. Davidson, Carl, 1988. "Multiunit Bargaining in Oligopolistic Industries," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 6(3), pages 397-422, July.
    9. Haller, Hans & Holden, Steinar, 1990. "A letter to the editor on wage bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 232-236, October.
    10. Gal-Or, Esther, 1985. "First Mover and Second Mover Advantages," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(3), pages 649-53, October.
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    Cited by:
    1. Domenico Buccella, 2013. "Unions’ bargaining coordination in multinational enterprises," SERIEs, Spanish Economic Association, vol. 4(4), pages 373-392, November.
    2. Chica Páez, Yolanda & Espinosa Alejos, María Paz, 2005. "Union Formation and Bargaining Rules in the Labor Market," DFAEII Working Papers 2005-07, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
    3. Raskovich, Alexander, 2007. "Ordered bargaining," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 1126-1143, October.
    4. Domenico Buccella, 2013. "Unions' bargaining coordination in multi-unit firms," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(1), pages 217-225.
    5. Jonas Björnerstedt & Andreas Westermark, 2009. "The inefficiency of price quantity bargaining," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 301-332, August.
    6. Björnerstedt, Jonas & Westermark, Andreas, 2006. "Bargaining and Strategic Discrimination," Working Paper Series 2006:6, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
    7. Clark, Derek J. & Pereau, Jean Christophe, 2009. "Fragmented property rights and royalty bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 546-553, October.

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