Unions, Oligopoly and the Natural Range of Employment
AbstractA simple two-sector, general-equilibrium macromodel is presented wi th oligopolistic price determination in the product market and a unionized labor market. In the first stage, unions set the nominal wage, and in the second stage, firms choose outputs given wages. By altering the balance of fiscal policy between the two sectors, the government can achieve a continuum of aggregate employment levels-the natural range of employment. A unique natural rate will occur only i f one requires fiscal policy to be the same in both sectors. This indicates that the natural rate property of some single or representative sect or macromodels is a special case. Copyright 1988 by Royal Economic Society.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 98 (1988)
Issue (Month): 393 (December)
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- Kornelius Kraft, 2006. "Wage versus efficient bargaining in oligopoly," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(7), pages 595-604.
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- M. Correa-López, 2006. "A model of unionized oligopoly in general equilibrium," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0605, Economics, The University of Manchester.
- Petrakis, Emmanuel & Vlassis, Minas, 2005. "The endogenous national minimum wage institution," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 747-762, December.
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- معدل طبيعي للبطالة in Wikipedia (Arabic)
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