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Multiunit Bargaining in Oligopolistic Industries

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Davidson, Carl

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Abstract

A model of wage determination in unionized oligopolistic industries is developed and used to compare the outcome of collective bargaining under two different bargaining structures-one in which the workers of each firm are represented by separate and independent unions (local bargaining) and one in which a national union represents all workers in the industry. In both cases, the bargaining problem has a unique outcome with industrywide bargaining resulting in higher wages. In addition, industrywide unions are inherently stable in that there are no incentives for independent unions to attempt to cheat on the collusive agreement. Copyright 1988 by University of Chicago Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Labor Economics.

Volume (Year): 6 (1988)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 397-422
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:6:y:1988:i:3:p:397-422

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  1. MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent, 2005. "Market integration and strike activity," CORE Discussion Papers 2005036, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
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  2. Bill Yang, 1995. "Unionized oligopoly, labor-management cooperation, and international competitiveness," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 62(1), pages 33-53, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Paul Heidhues, 2000. "Employers’ Associations, Industry-wide Unions, and Competition," CIG Working Papers FS IV 00-11, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
  4. Chrysovalantou Milliou & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2005. "Upstream Horizontal Mergers, Bargaining, Vertical Contracts," Economics Working Papers we051507, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
  5. Thorsten Upmann, 2008. "Labour Unions – To Unite or to Separate?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  6. Juan Carlos Barcena & María Luz Campo, 2004. "Timing of Wage Setting When Firms Invest in R&D," IKERLANAK 200308, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Nicole Gürtzgen, 2002. "Trade Liberalization and Union Wages in a Differentiated Bertrand Duopoly," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 133-151, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Nicole Gürtzgen, 2006. "The effect of firm- ans industry-level contracts on wages : evidence from longitudinal linked employer-employee data," ZEW Discussion Papers 06-82, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  9. Venturini, Luciano, 1998. "Countervailing Power And Antitrust Policy In The Food System," Conference Papers 14489, University of Minnesota, Center for International Food and Agricultural Policy. [Downloadable!]
  10. George Symeonidis, 2009. "Downstream merger and welfare in a bilateral oligopoly," Economics Discussion Papers 671, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Chrysovalantou Miliou & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2005. "Upstream Horizontal Mergers, Bargaining and Vertical Contracts," Working Papers 0509, University of Crete, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  12. Stennek, Johan & Tangerås, Thomas P., 2007. "Competition vs. Regulation in Mobile Telecommunications," CEPR Discussion Papers 6073, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Straume , Odd Rune & Sorgard, Lars, 2002. "Downstream Merger with Oligopolistic Input Suppliers," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  14. Noriaki Matsushima & Tomomichi Mizuno, 2009. "Vertical Separation as a Defense against Strong Suppliers," ISER Discussion Paper 0755, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. [Downloadable!]
  15. Hyung Bae, 2005. "Impact of labour unions on the merger incentive of firms," International Economic Journal, Korean International Economic Association, vol. 19(1), pages 91-94, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Kjell Erik Lommerud & Odd Rune Straume & Lars Sorgard, . "Merger Profitability in Unionized Oligopoly," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 10-00, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
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  17. Johan Stennek & Thomas TangerŒs, 2008. "Competition vs. Regulation in Mobile Telecommunications," Working Papers 08-09, NET Institute, revised Sep 2008. [Downloadable!]
  18. Ana MAULEON & Vincent J. VANNETELBOSCH, 2001. "Product Market Integration, Wage Bargaining and Strike Activity," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2001022, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES). [Downloadable!]
  19. M. Correa-López, 2006. "A model of unionized oligopoly in general equilibrium," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0605, Economics, The University of Manchester. [Downloadable!]
  20. López, Mónica Correa & Nayor, Robin A., 2002. "The Cournot-Bertrand Profit Differential : A Reversal Result In A Differentiated Duopoly With Wage Bargaining," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 631, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  21. Miguel González-Maestre & Vicente Calabuig, 2000. "Union Structure And The Incentives For Innovation In Oligopoly," Working Papers. Serie AD 2000-21, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  22. Klaas J. Beniers & Robert A.J. Dur, 2003. "Product Market Competition and Trade Union Structure," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-005/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 26 Aug 2003. [Downloadable!]
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