Union Delegation and Incentives for Merger
AbstractWe analyze a unionized duopoly model to examine how unions affect the incentives for merger. We find that, once the union has the option to delegate, an increase in the union bargaining power can create incentives for the firms to merge.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) in its series Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) with number 2002010.
Date of creation: 01 Jan 2002
Date of revision:
Union delegation; Wage bargaining; Mergers;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
- J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2002-06-13 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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