Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

The Strategic Use of Private Quality Standards in Food Supply Chains

Contents:

Author Info

  • Vanessa von Schlippenbach
  • Isabel Teichmann

Abstract

We explore the strategic role of private quality standards in food supply chains. Considering two symmetric retailers that are exclusively supplied by a finite number of producers and endogenizing the suppliers' delivery choice, we show that there exist two asymmetric equilibria in the retailers' quality requirements. Our results reveal that the retailers use private quality standards to improve their bargaining position in the intermediate goods market. This is associated with inefficiencies in the upstream production, which can be mitigated by enforcing a minimum quality standard. Copyright 2012, Oxford University Press.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/ajae/aas070
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Agricultural and Applied Economics Association in its journal American Journal of Agricultural Economics.

Volume (Year): 94 (2012)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
Pages: 1189-1201

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:94:y:2012:i:5:p:1189-1201

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 555 East Wells Street, Suite 1100, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202
Phone: (414) 918-3190
Fax: (414) 276-3349
Email:
Web page: http://www.aaea.org/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
  2. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-77, November.
  3. Scheffman, David T & Spiller, Pablo T, 1992. "Buyer's Strategies, Entry Barriers, and Competition," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 30(3), pages 418-36, July.
  4. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
  5. von Schlippenbach, Vanessa & Teichmann, Isabel, 2012. "The strategic use of private quality standards in food supply chains," DICE Discussion Papers 62, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  6. Abdelhakim Hammoudi & Ruben Hoffmann & Yves Surry, 2009. "Food safety standards and agri-food supply chains: an introductory overview," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 36(4), pages 469-478, December.
  7. Céline Bonnet & Pierre Dubois, 2010. "Inference on vertical contracts between manufacturers and retailers allowing for nonlinear pricing and resale price maintenance," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(1), pages 139-164.
  8. Roman Inderst & Christian Wey, 2003. "Buyer Power and Supplier Incentives," CIG Working Papers SP II 2003-05, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
  9. Éric Giraud-Héraud & Lamia Rouached & Louis-Georges Soler, 2006. "Private labels and public quality standards: How can consumer trust be restored after the mad cow crisis?," Quantitative Marketing and Economics, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 31-55, March.
  10. Henrick Horn & Asher Wolinsky, 1988. "Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for Merger," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 408-419, Autumn.
  11. Villas-Boas, Sofia B., 2007. "Vertical relationships between manufacturers and retailers: inference with limited data," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt6gz1t778, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
  12. Carlos D. Mayen & Joseph V. Balagtas & Corinne E. Alexander, 2010. "Technology Adoption and Technical Efficiency: Organic and Conventional Dairy Farms in the United States," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 92(1), pages 181-195.
  13. Jill J. McCluskey & Jason A. Winfree, 2009. "Pre-empting public regulation with private food quality standards," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 36(4), pages 525-539, December.
  14. Lutz, Stefan & Lyon, Thomas P & Maxwell, John W, 2000. "Quality Leadership When Regulatory Standards Are Forthcoming," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(3), pages 331-48, September.
  15. Philippe Marcoul & Luc Veyssiere, 2010. "A Financial Contracting Approach to the Role of Supermarkets in Farmers' Credit Access," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1051-1064.
  16. Battigalli, Pierpaulo & Fumagalli, Chiara & Polo, Michele, 2006. "Buyer Power and Quality Improvements," CEPR Discussion Papers 5814, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  17. Daniel P. O'Brien & Greg Shaffer, 1992. "Vertical Control with Bilateral Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(3), pages 299-308, Autumn.
  18. Inderst, Roman & Shaffer, Greg, 2004. "Retail Mergers: Buyer Power and Product Variety," CEPR Discussion Papers 4236, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  19. Kathleen Brooks & Jayson L. Lusk, 2010. "Stated and Revealed Preferences for Organic and Cloned Milk: Combining Choice Experiment and Scanner Data," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1229-1241.
  20. Marie-Luise Rau & Frank van Tongeren, 2009. "Heterogeneous firms and homogenising standards in agri-food trade: the Polish meat case," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 36(4), pages 479-505, December.
  21. Stéphane Caprice, 2006. "Multilateral Vertical Contracting with an Alternative Supply: The Welfare Effects of a Ban on Price Discrimination," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 63-80, 02.
  22. Paul W. Dobson & Michael Waterson & Stephen W. Davies, 2003. "The Patterns and Implications of Increasing Concentration in European Food Retailing," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(1), pages 111-125.
  23. Crampes, C. & Hollander, A., 1991. "Duopoly and Quality Standards," Cahiers de recherche 9128, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  24. Christopher Kanter & Kent D. Messer & Harry M. Kaiser, 2009. "Does Production Labeling Stigmatize Conventional Milk?," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 91(4), pages 1097-1109.
  25. Motta, Massimo, 1993. "Endogenous Quality Choice: Price vs. Quantity Competition," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(2), pages 113-31, June.
  26. Chambolle, Claire & Villas-Boas, Sofia B, 2008. "Buyer Power through Producer's Differentiation," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt7b93w47c, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
  27. Dixit, Avinash K & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1977. "Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(3), pages 297-308, June.
  28. Zhifeng Gao & Ted C. Schroeder, 2007. "Effects of Label Information on Consumer Willingness-to-Pay for Food Attributes," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 91(3), pages 795-809.
  29. Inderst, Roman & Wey, Christian, 2001. "Bargaining, Mergers and Technology Choice in Bilaterally Oligopolistic Industries," CEPR Discussion Papers 2981, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  30. Valletti, Tommaso M, 2000. "Minimum Quality Standards under Cournot Competition," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 235-45, November.
  31. Marie-Laure Allain, 2002. "The Balance of Power between Producers and Retailers ; a Differentiation model," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 68(3), pages 359-370.
  32. Bazoche Pascale & Giraud-Héraud Eric & Soler Louis-Georges, 2005. "Premium Private Labels, Supply Contracts, Market Segmentation, and Spot Prices," Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-30, February.
  33. Garcia Martinez, Marian & Poole, Nigel, 2004. "The development of private fresh produce safety standards: implications for developing Mediterranean exporting countries," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 229-255, June.
  34. Codron, Jean-Marie & Giraud-Heraud, Eric & Soler, Louis-Georges, 2005. "Minimum quality standards, premium private labels, and European meat and fresh produce retailing," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 270-283, June.
  35. McAfee, R Preston & Schwartz, Marius, 1994. "Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 210-30, March.
  36. Uri Ronnen, 1991. "Minimum Quality Standards, Fixed Costs, and Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(4), pages 490-504, Winter.
  37. Vandemoortele, Thijs, 2011. "When are Private Standards more Stringent than Public Standards?," 2011 International Congress, August 30-September 2, 2011, Zurich, Switzerland 115544, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
  38. Douadia Bougherara & Pierre Combris, 2009. "Eco-labelled food products: what are consumers paying for?," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 36(3), pages 321-341, September.
  39. John C. Bernard & Daria J. Bernard, 2007. "What Is It About Organic Milk? An Experimental Analysis," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 91(3), pages 826-836.
  40. Bokusheva, Raushan & Buchenrieder, Gertrud, 2006. "Contributions to the 4th young scientists workshop on agricultural development in Central and Eastern Europe," IAMO Discussion Papers 98, Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern Europe (IAMO).
  41. Gil, Jose Maria & Gracia, Azucena & Sanchez Garcia, Mercedes, 2000. "Market Segmentation And Willingness To Pay For Organic Products In Spain," International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, International Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IAMA), vol. 3(02).
  42. Zhiqi Chen, 2004. "Monopoly and Product Diversity: The Role of Retailer Countervailing Power," Carleton Economic Papers 04-19, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
  43. Fernando Balsevich & Julio A. Berdegué & Luis Flores & Denise Mainville & Thomas Reardon, 2003. "Supermarkets and Produce Quality and Safety Standards in Latin America," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1147-1154.
  44. McAfee, R. Preston & Schwartz, Marius, 1995. "The non-existence of pairwise-proof equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 251-259, September.
  45. David Boselie & Spencer Henson & Dave Weatherspoon, 2003. "Supermarket Procurement Practices in Developing Countries: Redefining the Roles of the Public and Private Sectors," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1155-1161.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Vanessa von Schlippenbach & Isabel Teichmann, 2011. "The Strategic Use of Private Quality Standards in Food Supply Chains," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1120, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  2. Bouamra-Mechemache, Zohra & Jianyu, Yu, 2013. "Production Standards, Competition and Vertical Relationship," TSE Working Papers 13-417, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:94:y:2012:i:5:p:1189-1201. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.