When are Private Standards more Stringent then Public Standards?
AbstractRetailersâ€™ private standards are increasingly important in addressing consumer concerns about safety, quality and social and environmental issues. Empirical evidence shows that these private standards are frequently more stringent than their public counterparts. I develop a political economy model that may contribute to explaining this stylized fact. I show that if producers exercise their political power to persuade the government to impose a lower public standard, retailers may apply their market power to install a private standard at a higher level than the public one, depending on several factors.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven in its series LICOS Discussion Papers with number 29611.
Date of creation: 2011
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Private standards; public standards; political economy;
Other versions of this item:
- Vandemoortele, Thijs, 2011. "When are Private Standards more Stringent than Public Standards?," 2011 International Congress, August 30-September 2, 2011, Zurich, Switzerland 115544, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
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