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A Dynamic Perspective on Minimum Quality Standards under Cournot Competition

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Author Info
Stefan Napel
Gunnar Oldehaver

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Abstract

Imposing a minimum quality standard (MQS) is conventionally regarded as harmful if firms compete in quantities. This, however, ignores its possible dynamic effects. We show that an MQS can hinder collusion, resulting in dynamic welfare gains that reduce and may outweigh the static losses which are caused by regulation's distortive effect on equilibrium qualities. Verdicts on MQS thus depend even more on the market structure at hand than has been acknowledged.

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File URL: http://www.bgpe.de/texte/DP/082_napel.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version, 2009
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE) in its series Working Papers with number 082.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bav:wpaper:082_napel

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Web page: http://www.bgpe.de/
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Related research
Keywords: Minimal quality standard; Cournot competition; collusion;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-4.

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