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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Journal of Industrial Organization.

Volume (Year): 12 (1994)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 155-177
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Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:12:y:1994:i:2:p:155-177

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