Minimum Safety Standard, Consumers' Information, and Competition, The
AbstractThis paper explores the effects of a standard influencing care choice. Firm(s) may increase the probability of offering safe products by incurring a cost. Under duopoly, they compete either in prices or in quantities. Under perfect information about safety for consumers, the selected standard that corrects a safety underinvestment is always compatible with competition. Safety overinvestment only emerges under competition in quantities and relatively low values of the cost. Under imperfect information about safety for consumers, the standard leads to a monopoly situation. However, for relatively large values of the cost, a standard cannot impede the market failure coming from the lack of information.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University in its series Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications with number 07-wp441.
Date of creation: Feb 2007
Date of revision:
information; market structure; safety; standard.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2007-06-11 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2007-06-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2007-06-11 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-MIC-2007-06-11 (Microeconomics)
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- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2008:i:2:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
- Bonroy, Olivier & Lemarié, Stéphane, 2012.
"Downstream labeling and upstream price competition,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 347-360.
- Bonroy, O. & Lemarié, S., 2010. "Downstream labeling and upstream price competition," Working Papers 201001, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
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