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Collective Reputation, Entry and Minimum Safety Standard

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Author Info
Rouviere, Elodie
Soubeyran, Raphael

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Abstract

This article deals with the issue of entry into an industry where firms share a collective reputation. First, we show that free entry is not socially optimal; there is a need for regulation through the imposition of a minimum quality standard. Second, we argue that a minimum quality standard can induce firms to enter the market. Contrary to conventional wisdom, a minimum quality standard should not always be considered as a barrier to entry.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by European Association of Agricultural Economists in its series 2008 International Congress, August 26-29, 2008, Ghent, Belgium with number 44465.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:ags:eaae08:44465

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Related research
Keywords: Collective Reputation; Entry; Minimum Quality Standard; Institutional and Behavioral Economics;

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  1. Valletti, Tommaso M, 2000. "Minimum Quality Standards under Cournot Competition," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 235-45, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Crampes, C. & Hollander, A., 1991. "Duopoly and Quality Standards," Cahiers de recherche 9128, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
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  3. Uri Ronnen, 1991. "Minimum Quality Standards, Fixed Costs, and Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(4), pages 490-504, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Ecchia, Giulio & Lambertini, Luca, 1997. "Minimum Quality Standards and Collusion," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 45(1), pages 101-13, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Miguel Carriquiry & Bruce A. Babcock, 2007. "Reputations, Market Structure, and the Choice of Quality Assurance Systems in the Food Industry," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, American Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 89(1), pages 12-23, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Paolo Garella & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2008. "Minimum quality standards and consumers’ information," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 283-302, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Leland, Hayne E, 1979. "Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1328-46, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Nicolas Boccard & Xavier Wauthy, 2005. "Enforcing Domestic Quality Dominance through Quotas," Review of International Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 13(2), pages 250-261, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Kwamena K. Quagrainie & Jill J. McCluskey & Maria L. Loureiro, 2003. "A Latent Structure Approach to Measuring Reputation," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 69(4), pages 966-977, April.
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-26.

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