Trade Effects of Minimum Quality Standards with and without Deterred Entry
AbstractIn a model of vertical product differentiation, duopolistic firms face qualitydependent costs and compete in quality and price in two segmented markets. Minimum quality standards, set uniformly or according to the principle of Mutual Recognition, can be used to increase welfare. The analysis includes entry deterrence by the choice of a particular standard. With identical costs, both industries remain in the market under either regulatory alternative. Mutual Recognition is the optimal policy choice for either region. With signifi - cantly different costs, the Full-Harmonization outcome includes only one firm and leads to a maximal sum of regional welfares.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Center for Economic Integration, Sejong University in its journal Journal of Economic Integration.
Volume (Year): 15 (2000)
Issue (Month): ()
product differentiation; oligopoly; trade; quality standards; entry;
Other versions of this item:
- Lutz, Stefan, 1996. "Trade Effects of Minimum Quality Standards with and without Deterred Entry," CEPR Discussion Papers 1384, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies
- F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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