Regulatory protection when firms decide first on technical collaboration and R&D
AbstractWe investigate the imposition of a horizontal technical barrier to trade (HTBT) in a symmetric, cross-hauling duopoly. Tariffs and subsidies are ruled out, but, in the absence of a mutual recognition agreement, it is possible for governments to impose HTBTs, so long as firms apply different technologies. If firms are first movers, this possibility may induce them to avoid technical collaboration, in order to tempt governments into creating national monopolies, except where spillovers and R&D effects are high. This exacerbates the costs of regulatory protection, compared to standard models without R&D or spillovers.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School of Economics, La Trobe University in its series Working Papers with number 2012.05.
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Research and development; spillovers; trade; protection;
Other versions of this item:
- Huw Edwards & Joanna Poyago-Theotoky, 2013. "Regulatory Protection When Firms Decide First on Technical Collaboration and R&D," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(4), pages 750-764, 09.
- F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General
- F19 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Other
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-11-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2012-11-03 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CSE-2012-11-03 (Economics of Strategic Management)
- NEP-INO-2012-11-03 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2012-11-03 (Intellectual Property Rights)
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