Regulatory Protection When Firms Move First
AbstractI investigate the imposition of a horizontal technical barrier to trade (HTBT) in a symmetric, cross-hauling duopoly. Tariffs and subsidies are ruled out, but, in the absence of a mutual recognition agreement, it is possible for governments to impose HTBTs, so long as firms apply different technologies. If firms are first movers, this possibility may induce them to avoid technical collaboration, in order to tempt governments into creating local monopolies, except where spillovers and R&D effects are high. This exacerbates the costs of regulatory protection, compared to standard models without R&D or spillovers.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Loughborough University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number 2009_19.
Date of creation: Nov 2009
Date of revision: Nov 2009
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Research and development; spillovers; trade; protection.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General
- F19 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Other
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
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