International Share Ownership, Profit Shifting and Protectionism
AbstractI examine the implications of increasing stock market globalisation for the economics of protection. European, Japanese and Australian data mostly indicate that over 30 per cent of the stock market is now foreign-owned, a large increase on the 1980s. Foreign share ownership in the USA is lower, but increasing fast. This degree of foreign share ownership is likely to change qualitatively the nature of governmental support for 'domestic' firms. A series of worked duopoly examples suggests that the level of foreign share ownership is usually sufficient for profit shifting on its own no longer to justify protection.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 164 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.mohr.de/jite
Postal: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany
Other versions of this item:
- T.Huw Edwards, 2007. "International Share Ownership, Profit Shifting and Protectionism," Discussion Paper Series 2007_28, Department of Economics, Loughborough University, revised Nov 2007.
- F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General
- F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- James A. Brander, 1995.
"Strategic Trade Policy,"
NBER Working Papers
5020, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- James E. Anderson & Eric van Wincoop, 2000.
"Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to the Border Puzzle,"
Boston College Working Papers in Economics
485, Boston College Department of Economics.
- James E. Anderson & Eric van Wincoop, 2003. "Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to the Border Puzzle," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 170-192, March.
- James E. Anderson & Eric van Wincoop, 2001. "Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to the Border Puzzle," NBER Working Papers 8079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Dick, Andrew R., 1993. "Strategic trade policy and welfare : The empirical consequences of cross-ownership," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3-4), pages 227-249, November.
- Eaton, Jonathan & Grossman, Gene M, 1986.
"Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 101(2), pages 383-406, May.
- Jonathan Eaton & Gene M. Grossman, 1983. "Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy Under Oligopoly," NBER Working Papers 1236, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Neary, J. Peter, 1994.
"Cost asymmetries in international subsidy games: Should governments help winners or losers?,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 37(3-4), pages 197-218, November.
- Neary, J Peter, 1991. "Cost Asymmetries in International Subsidy Games: Should Governments Help Winners or Losers?," CEPR Discussion Papers 560, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Nina Pavcnik, 2002. "Trade Disputes in the Commercial Aircraft Industry," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(5), pages 733-751, 05.
- Michael P. Devereux & Rachel Griffith & Alexander Klemm, 2002. "Corporate income tax reforms and international tax competition," Economic Policy, CEPR & CES & MSH, vol. 17(35), pages 449-495, October.
- Maskus, Keith E. & Wilson, John S. & Tsunehiro Otsuki, 2000. "Quantifying the impact of technical barriers to trade : a framework for analysis," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2512, The World Bank.
- T.Huw Edwards, 2007. "Horizontal Regulatory Protection. Its appeal and implictions in a linear Cournot duopoly," Discussion Paper Series 2007_05, Department of Economics, Loughborough University, revised Feb 2007.
- Jota Ishikawa & Yoichi Sugita, 2004. "Commercial policy under cross-border ownership," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 663, Econometric Society.
- Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1985.
"Export subsidies and international market share rivalry,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 18(1-2), pages 83-100, February.
- James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1984. "Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry," NBER Working Papers 1464, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Lee, Sanghack, 1990. "International equity markets and trade policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 173-184, August.
- T.Huw Edwards, 2009. "Regulatory Protection When Firms Move First," Discussion Paper Series 2009_19, Department of Economics, Loughborough University, revised Nov 2009.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Wolpert).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.