Regulation of Product Safety Characteristics under Imperfect Observability
AbstractIn this paper, we consider the problem of setting minimum safety standards for observable safety characteristics and the proper amount of effort in the production of safety for a product which has some unobservable safety attributes. We formulate a second-best optimum for a regulator, examine the interplay between safety effort and a minimum safety standard, and study how the internalization of excess costs or benefits by a self-interested regulator affects the minimum safety standard and the safety effort level. Finally, we present two examples using a utility function which is widely used in the law and economics literature. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Regulatory Economics.
Volume (Year): 6 (1994)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100298
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Stéphan Marette, 2007. "Minimum safety standard, consumers’ information and competition," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 259-285, December.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.