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Buyer Power through Producer's Differentiation

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Author Info

  • Claire Chambolle

    (CECO - Laboratoire d'econometrie de l'école polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7657 - Polytechnique - X)

  • Sofia Villas-Boas

    (UC Berkeley)

Abstract

Cet article montre que des distributeurs peuvent décider d'offrir des produits différenciés, non pas pour relâcher la concurrence horizontale, mais pour accroître leur pouvoir d'achat vis-à-vis de leur fournisseur. Nous analysons un modèle simple où deux producteurs offrent des produits différenciés en qualité à deux distributeurs en activité sur des marches séparés qui ne peuvent offrir qu'un seul produit aux consommateurs. A la première étape du jeu, les distributeurs choisissent quel produit mettre en rayon, puis chaque distributeur et son fournisseur négocient sur un contrat de tarif binôme. Enfin, les distributeurs choisissent leur quantités. Lorsque les coûts de production sont convexes, la part des profits joint revenant au distributeur est plus élevée lorsque les distributeurs choisissent de se différencier. L'origine de la différenciation peut donc être uniquement liée au désir des distributeurs d'accroître leur pouvoir d'achat: via la différenciation des fournisseurs, le distributeur obtient une plus large part de profits joints plus faibles. Ce résultat est robuste lorsque l'on introduit de la concurrence en aval. Nous mettons en évidence les conséquences de cette stratégie de différenciation sur le surplus des consommateurs.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00243058.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00243058

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Related research

Keywords: Puissance d'achat; Gamme de produit; Différentiation des produits;

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References

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  1. Chemla, G., 1999. "Downstream Competition, Foreclosure, and Vertical Integration," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. 99-18, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
  2. Catherine C. de Fontenay & Joshua S. Gans, 2004. "Vertical Integration in the Presence of Upstream Competition," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, The University of Melbourne 904, The University of Melbourne.
  3. Daniel P. O'Brien & Greg Shaffer, 1992. "Vertical Control with Bilateral Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(3), pages 299-308, Autumn.
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  8. Avenel, E. & Caprice, S., 2006. "Upstream market power and product line differentiation in retailing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 319-334, March.
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Cited by:
  1. Draganska, Michaela & Klapper, Daniel & Villas-Boas, Sofia B., 2008. "A larger slice or a larger pie? : an empirical investigation of bargaining power in the distribution channel," CUDARE Working Paper Series, University of California at Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Policy 1046, University of California at Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Policy.
  2. Vanessa von Schlippenbach & Isabel Teichmann, 2012. "The Strategic Use of Private Quality Standards in Food Supply Chains," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1189-1201.

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