Optimal production channel for private labels: Too much or too little innovation?
AbstractWe analyze the impact of the private label production channel on innovation. A retailer may either choose a competitive fringe or rely on a brand manufacturer to produce its private label. The trade-o between the two channels is a choice between too much or too little innovation, i.e. quality investment, on the private label. On the one hand, when choosing the competitive fringe, the retailer over-invests to increase its buyer power. On the other hand, when the brand manufacturer is selected, a hold-up e ect leads to under-investment. In addition, selecting the brand manufacturer may create economies of scale that spur innovation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS in its series Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) with number 201314.
Date of creation: Apr 2013
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Postal: CREM (UMR CNRS 6211) - Faculty of Economics, 7 place Hoche, 35065 Rennes Cedex - France
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-04-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2013-04-27 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-INO-2013-04-27 (Innovation)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mills, David E, 1995. "Why Retailers Sell Private Labels," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(3), pages 509-28, Fall.
- Soberman, David A. & Parker, Philip M., 2004. "Private labels: psychological versioning of typical consumer products," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(6), pages 849-861, June.
- Bergès-Sennou Fabian & Bontems Philippe & Réquillart Vincent, 2004. "Economics of Private Labels: A Survey of Literature," Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-25, February.
- Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
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