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Buyer Power and Supplier Incentives Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Inderst, Roman
Wey, Christian
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This Paper investigates how the formation of larger buyers affects a supplier's profits and, by doing so, his incentives to undertake non-contractible activities. We first identify two channels of buyer power, which allows larger buyers to obtain discounts. We subsequently examine the effects of buyer power on the supplier's incentives and social welfare. Contrary to some informal claims in the policy debate on buyer power, we find that the exercise of buyer power -even though reducing supplier's profits- may often increase a supplier's incentive to undertake welfare enhancing activities.
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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number
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Date of creation: Sep 2002Date of revision:
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Keywords: buyer power ; mergers ; retailing ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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