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Downstream Competition, Foreclosure and Vertical Integration

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Author Info

  • Gilles Chemla

    ()

  • Gilles Chemla

    (DRM - Dauphine Recherches en Management - CNRS : UMR7088 - Université Paris IX - Paris Dauphine)

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    Abstract

    This paper shows that dominant firms may wish to encourage competition in vertically-related markets. It shows that firms' incentives to vertically integrate other firms depends on the competitive environment.

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    File URL: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/67/98/47/PDF/cfvijems.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00679847.

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    Date of creation: 2003
    Date of revision:
    Publication status: Published, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2003, 12, 2, 261-289.
    Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00679847

    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00679847
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    Related research

    Keywords: competition; forclosure; vertical integration;

    References

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Bruno Biais & David Martimort & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2000. "Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 68(4), pages 799-838, July.
    2. John, Kose & Ofek, Eli, 1995. "Asset sales and increase in focus," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 105-126, January.
    3. G.F. Mathewson & R.A. Winter, 1984. "An Economic Theory of Vertical Restraints," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(1), pages 27-38, Spring.
    4. Lang, Larry & Poulsen, Annette & Stulz, Rene, 1995. "Asset sales, firm performance, and the agency costs of managerial discretion," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 3-37, January.
    5. Kühn, Kai-Uwe & Vives, Xavier, 1995. "Excess Entry, Vertical Integration and Welfare," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 1293, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1992. "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 1-42, January.
    7. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, December.
    8. Klemperer, Paul D & Meyer, Margaret A, 1989. "Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 57(6), pages 1243-77, November.
    9. Aghion, Philippe & Bolton, Patrick, 1987. "Contracts as a Barrier to Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 388-401, June.
    10. G. Chemla, 1999. "Downstream competition, foreclosure, and vertical integration," THEMA Working Papers 99-18, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    11. Katz, Michael L., 1991. "Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley qt79b870w0, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    12. McLaren, J., 1996. "'Globalization' and Vertical Structure," Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics 1996_21, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
    13. Bolton, Patrick & Whinston, Michael D, 1993. "Incomplete Contracts, Vertical Integration, and Supply Assurance," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(1), pages 121-48, January.
    14. Michael H. Riordan & David J. Salant, 1994. "Exclusion and Integration in the Market for Video Programming Delivered to the Home," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme 0051, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
    15. Chemla, Gilles, 2000. "Downstream Competition, Foreclosure, and Vertical Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 2647, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Martimort, D., 1992. "Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency and Multiprincipals Incentive Thoery," Papers, Toulouse - GREMAQ 92.278, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
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    Cited by:
    1. Doh-Shin Jeon & Domenico Menicucci, 2005. "Bundling Electronic Journals and Competition among Publishers," Working Papers 270, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    2. Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 2007. "A Primer on Foreclosure," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier.

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