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Anti-competitive effects of resale-below-cost laws

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  • Allain, Marie-Laure
  • Chambolle, Claire

Abstract

We show that resale-below-cost laws enable producers to impose industrywide price-floors to retailers. This mechanism suppresses downstream competition but also dampens upstream competition, leading to higher prices. Price-floor may be more profitable for producers than resale price maintenance contracts and, while resale price maintenance may have ambiguous effect on welfare, price-floors always harm welfare. Retailers' buyer power appears as a key element for a price-floor to work out.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Journal of Industrial Organization.

Volume (Year): 29 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4 (July)
Pages: 373-385

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Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:29:y:2011:i:4:p:373-385

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505551

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Keywords: Price-floor Resale price maintenance Buyer power Competition;

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References

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  1. Greg Shaffer, 1991. "Slotting Allowances and Resale Price Maintenance: A Comparison of Facilitating Practices," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(1), pages 120-135, Spring.
  2. Bonnet, Céline & Dubois, Pierre, 2009. "Inference on Vertical Contracts between Manufacturers and Retailers Allowing for Nonlinear Pricing and Resale Price Maintenance," TSE Working Papers 09-040, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  3. Vanessa von Schlippenbach, 2008. "Complementarities, Below-Cost Pricing, and Welfare Losses," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 788, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  4. Hart, O. & Tirole, J., 1990. "Vertical Integration And Market Foreclosure," Working papers 548, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  5. Villas-Boas, Sofia B., 2006. "Vertical relationships between manufacturers and retailers: inference with limited data," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt0z26d2v9, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
  6. Marie-Laure Allain & Claire Chambolle, 2007. "Loss leaders banning laws as vertical restraints," Post-Print hal-00242935, HAL.
  7. Paul W. Dobson & Michael Waterson, 1996. "Product Range and Interfirm Competition," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(3), pages 317-341, 09.
  8. Daniel P. O'Brien & Greg Shaffer, 1992. "Vertical Control with Bilateral Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(3), pages 299-308, Autumn.
  9. Rod Anderson & Ronald Johnson, 1999. "Antitrust and Sales-Below-Cost Laws: The Case of Retail Gasoline," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 189-204, May.
  10. McAfee, R Preston & Schwartz, Marius, 1994. "Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 210-30, March.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Özlem Bedre-Defolie & Stéphane Caprice, 2011. "Merger efficiency and welfare implications of buyer power," ESMT Research Working Papers ESMT-11-07, ESMT European School of Management and Technology.
  2. Marie-Laure Allain & Claire Chambolle & Stéphane Turolla & Sofia B. Villas-Boas, 2013. "The Impact of Retail Mergers on Food Prices : Evidence from France," Working Papers 2013-18, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
  3. Stéphane Turolla, 2012. "Spatial competition in the French supermarket industry," Working Papers SMART - LERECO 12-01, INRA UMR SMART.
  4. Marie-Laure Allain & Claire Chambolle & Stéphane Turolla & Sofia Villas-Boas, 2013. "The impact of retail mergers on food prices: evidence from France," Working Papers 181943, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, France.
  5. Stephane Caprice & Vanessa von Schlippenbach, 2008. "Competition policy in a concentrated and globalized retail industry," Working Papers 23775, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, France.
  6. Noriaki Matsushima & Akira Miyaoka, 2013. "Who benefits from resale-below-cost laws?," ISER Discussion Paper 0875, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  7. Eliana Viviano & Luciana Aimone Gigio & Emanuela Ciapanna & Daniele Coin & Fabrizio Colonna & Federica Lagna & Raffaele Santioni, 2012. "The retail trade sector and the food industry in Italy," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 119, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.

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