Relative concerns and delays in bargaining with private information
AbstractWe consider Rubinstein's two-person alternating-offer bargaining model with two-sided incomplete information. We investigate the effects of one party having relative concerns on the bargaining outcome and the delay in reaching an agreement. We find that facing an opponent having stronger relative concerns only hurts the bargainer when she is stronger than her opponent. In addition, we show that an increase of one party's relative concerns will decrease the maximum delay in reaching an agreement.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2013034.
Date of creation: 09 Jul 2013
Date of revision:
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relative concerns; alternating-offer bargaining; private information; maximal delays;
Other versions of this item:
- Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2013. "Relative Concerns and Delays in Bargaining with Private Information," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(3), pages 329-338, June.
- MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent, . "Relative concerns and delays in bargaining with private information," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2482, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
- J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-09-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2013-09-26 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-CTA-2013-09-26 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2013-09-26 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2013-09-26 (Microeconomics)
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