Trust and Manipulation in Social Networks
AbstractWe investigate the role of manipulation in a model of opinion formation where agents have opinions about some common question of interest. Agents repeatedly communicate with their neighbors in the social network, can exert some effort to manipulate the trust of others, and update their opinions taking weighted averages of neighbors' opinions. The incentives to manipulate are given by the agents' preferences. We show that manipulation can modify the trust structure and lead to a connected society, and thus, make the society reaching a consensus. Manipulation fosters opinion leadership, but the manipulated agent may even gain influence on the long-run opinions. In sufficiently homophilic societies, manipulation accelerates (slows down) convergence if it decreases (increases) homophily. Finally, we investigate the tension between information aggregation and spread of misinformation. We find that if the ability of the manipulating agent is weak and the agents underselling (overselling) their information gain (lose) overall influence, then manipulation reduces misinformation and agents converge jointly to more accurate opinions about some underlying true state.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne in its series Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne with number 13065.
Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2013
Date of revision:
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Social networks; trust; manipulation; opinion leadership; consensus; Wisdom of crowds.;
Other versions of this item:
- FORSTER, Manuel & MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent, 2013. "Trust and manipulation in social networks," CORE Discussion Papers 2013050, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Manuel Förster & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2013. "Trust and Manipulation in Social Networks," UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00881145, HAL.
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-11-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2013-11-16 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-CTA-2013-11-16 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2013-11-16 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2013-11-16 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-NET-2013-11-16 (Network Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2013-11-16 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
- NEP-URE-2013-11-16 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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