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Trust and Manipulation in Social Networks

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Abstract

We investigate the role of manipulation in a model of opinion formation where agents have opinions about some common question of interest. Agents repeatedly communicate with their neighbors in the social network, can exert some effort to manipulate the trust of others, and update their opinions taking weighted averages of neighbors' opinions. The incentives to manipulate are given by the agents' preferences. We show that manipulation can modify the trust structure and lead to a connected society, and thus, make the society reaching a consensus. Manipulation fosters opinion leadership, but the manipulated agent may even gain influence on the long-run opinions. In sufficiently homophilic societies, manipulation accelerates (slows down) convergence if it decreases (increases) homophily. Finally, we investigate the tension between information aggregation and spread of misinformation. We find that if the ability of the manipulating agent is weak and the agents underselling (overselling) their information gain (lose) overall influence, then manipulation reduces misinformation and agents converge jointly to more accurate opinions about some underlying true state.

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File URL: ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2013/13065.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne in its series Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne with number 13065.

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Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mse:cesdoc:13065

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Keywords: Social networks; trust; manipulation; opinion leadership; consensus; Wisdom of crowds.;

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  1. Berno Buechel & Tim Hellmann & Stefan Kloessner, 2012. "Opinion Dynamics under Conformity," Working Papers 469, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  2. Daron Acemoglu & Asuman Ozdaglar, 2011. "Opinion Dynamics and Learning in Social Networks," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 3-49, March.
  3. Daron Acemoglu & Munther A. Dahleh & Ilan Lobel & Asuman Ozdaglar, 2011. "Bayesian Learning in Social Networks," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 78(4), pages 1201-1236.
  4. Peter M. Demarzo & Dimitri Vayanos & Jeffrey Zwiebel, 2003. "Persuasion Bias, Social Influence, And Unidimensional Opinions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 118(3), pages 909-968, August.
  5. Acemoglu, Daron & Ozdaglar, Asuman & ParandehGheibi, Ali, 2010. "Spread of (mis)information in social networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 194-227, November.
  6. Nigar Hashimzade & Jean Hindriks & Gareth D. Myles, 2006. "Solutions Manual to Accompany Intermediate Public Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582694, December.
  7. Syngjoo Choi & Douglas Gale & Shachar Kariv, 2012. "Social learning in networks: a Quantal Response Equilibrium analysis of experimental data," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 135-157, September.
  8. Manuel Förster & Ana Mauleon & Vincent J. Vannetelbosch, 2014. "Trust and Manipulation in Social Networks," Working Papers 2014.50, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  9. Gullberg, Anne Therese, 2008. "Lobbying friends and foes in climate policy: The case of business and environmental interest groups in the European Union," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 2954-2962, August.
  10. Benjamin Golub & Matthew O. Jackson, 2012. "How Homophily Affects the Speed of Learning and Best-Response Dynamics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 127(3), pages 1287-1338.
  11. CAULIER, Jean-François & MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent, 2013. "Allocation rules for coalitional network games," CORE Discussion Papers 2013032, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Manuel Förster & Ana Mauleon & Vincent J. Vannetelbosch, 2014. "Trust and Manipulation in Social Networks," Working Papers 2014.50, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  2. MANIQUET, François & MORELLI, Massimo & ,, 2013. "Approval quorums dominate participation quorums," CORE Discussion Papers 2013054, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. WOLSEY, Laurence & YAMAN , Hand & ,, 2013. "Continuous knapsack sets with divisible capacities," CORE Discussion Papers 2013063, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. RUSSO, Federica & MOUCHART, Michel & WUNSCH, Guillaume, 2013. "Confounding and control in a multivariate system. An issue in causal attribution," CORE Discussion Papers 2013068, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Berno Buechel & Tim Hellmann & Stefan Kölßner, 2014. "Opinion Dynamics and Wisdom under Conformity," Working Papers 2014.51, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  6. BELLELFLAMME, Paul & BLOCH , Francis & ,, 2013. "Dynamic protection of innovations through patents and trade secrets," CORE Discussion Papers 2013059, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  7. MAULEON, Ana & MOLIS, Elena & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent & VERGOTE , Wouter, 2013. "Dominance invariant one-to-one matching problems," CORE Discussion Papers 2013052, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  8. GABSZEWICZ, Jean & ZANAJ, Skerdilajda & ,, 2013. "(Un)stable vertical collusive agreements," CORE Discussion Papers 2013053, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  9. MADANI, Mehdi & VAN VYVE, Mathieu, 2013. "A new formulation of the European day-ahead electricity market problem and its algorithmic consequences," CORE Discussion Papers 2013074, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  10. PARDO-GARCIA, Christina & SEMPERE-MONERRIS, Jose J., 2013. "Equilibrium mergers in a composite good industry with efficiencies," CORE Discussion Papers 2013067, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  11. VARDAR, N. Baris, 2013. "Imperfect resource substitution and optimal transition to clean technologies," CORE Discussion Papers 2013072, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  12. DI SUMMA, Marco, 2013. "The convex hull of the all-different system with the inclusion property: a simple proof," CORE Discussion Papers 2013069, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  13. PAPAVASILIOU, Anthony & HE, Yi & SVOBODA, Alva, 2013. "Self-commitment of combined cycle units under electricity price uncertainty," CORE Discussion Papers 2013051, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  14. LAMAS, ALEJANDRO & CHEVALIER, Philippe, 2013. "Jumping the hurdles for collaboration: fairness in operations pooling in the absence of transfer payments," CORE Discussion Papers 2013073, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

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