Dynamic Protection of Innovations through Patents and Trade Secrets
AbstractThis paper analyzes the optimal protection strategy for an innovator of a complex innovation who faces the risk of imitation by a competitor. We suppose that the innovation can be continuously fragmented into sub-innovations. We characterize the optimal mix of patent and trade secrets when the innovator faces a strict novelty requirement and can only patent a fraction of the innovation once. We also study the optimal dynamic patenting policy in a soft novelty regime, when the innovator can successively patent different fragments of the process. We compare a regime with prior user rights, when the innovator can use the secret part of the process, even when it is patented by an imitator with a regime without prior user rights.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 4486.
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
patents; trade secrets; dynamic protection of innovation; intellectual property rights;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
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