Choosing the Scope of Trade Secret Law when Secrets Complement Patents
AbstractWe present a model where an incumbent firm has a proprietary product whose technology consists of at least two components, one of which is patented while the other is kept secret. At the patent expiration date, an entrant firm will enter the market on the same footing as the incumbent if it is successful in duplicating, at certain costs, the secret component of the incumbent’s technology. Otherwise, it will enter the market with a production cost disadvantage. We show that under not too restrictive conditions a broad scope of trade secret law is socially beneficial either the patent length is adjusted in order to grant the innovator the right reward or it is fixed and the innovator is overrewarded
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Turin in its series Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers with number 200911.
Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2009
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Ottoz, Elisabetta & Cugno, Franco, 2011. "Choosing the scope of trade secret law when secrets complement patents," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 219-227.
- Ottoz, Elisabetta & Cugno, Franco, 2010. "Choosing the scope of trade secret law when secrets complement patents," MPRA Paper 20672, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property Rights
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
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