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Fences and competition in patent races Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Schneider, Cédric
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This paper studies the behaviour of firms facing the decision to create a patent fence, defined as a portfolio of substitute patents. We set up a patent race model, where firms can decide either to patent their inventions, or to rely on secrecy. It is shown that firms build patent fences, when the duopoly profits net of R&D costs are positive. We also demonstrate that in this context, a firm will rely on secrecy when the speed of discovery of the subsequent invention is high compared to the competitors. Furthermore, we compare the model under the First-to-Invent and First-to-File legal rules. Finally, we analyze the welfare implications of patent fence
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number
2087.
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Date of creation: 02 Dec 2005Date of revision:
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Find related papers by JEL classification: L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Intellectual Property Rights
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports :
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2004.
"Efficient Patent Pools ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 691-711, June.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Lerner, Josh & Tirole, Jean, 2003.
"Efficient Patent Pools ,"
IDEI Working Papers
211, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
[Downloadable!] Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2002.
"Efficient Patent Pools ,"
NBER Working Papers
9175, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Bronwyn H. Hall & Stuart J.H. Graham & Dietmar Harhoff, 2003.
"Prospects for Improving U.S. Patent Quality via Post-grant Opposition ,"
NBER Working Papers
9731, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Bronwyn H. Hall & Stuart J. H. Graham & Dietmar Harhoff & David C. Mowery, 2004.
"Prospects for Improving U.S. Patent Quality via Post-grant Opposition ,"
Law and Economics
0401002, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!] Bronwyn Hall & Stuart Graham & Dietmar Harhoff & David Mowery, 2003.
"Prospects for Improving U.S. Patent Quality via Post-grant Opposition ,"
Department of Economics, Working Paper Series
1054, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
[Downloadable!] Bronwyn H. Hall & Stuart Graham & Dietmar Harhoff & David C. Mowery, 2004.
"Prospects for Improving U.S. Patent Quality via Postgrant Opposition ,"
NBER Chapters ,
in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 4, pages 115-144
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[Downloadable!] Jensen, Richard & Thursby, Marie, 1996.
"Patent Races, Product Standards, and International Competition ,"
International Economic Review ,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(1), pages 21-49, February.
Other versions:
Jensen, R. & Thursby, M., 1994.
"Patent Races, Product Standards, and International Competition ,"
Papers
94-015, Purdue University, Krannert School of Management - Center for International Business Education and Research (CIBER).
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NBER Working Papers
3870, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Bronwyn H. Hall, 2005.
"Exploring the Patent Explosion ,"
The Journal of Technology Transfer ,
Springer, vol. 30(2_2), pages 35-48, 01.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Nancy T. Gallini, 2002.
"The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S. Patent Reform ,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives ,
American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 131-154, Spring.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Denicolo, Vincenzo, 1996.
"Patent Races and Optimal Patent Breadth and Length ,"
Journal of Industrial Economics ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(3), pages 249-65, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Mansfield, Edwin, 1985.
"How Rapidly Does New Industrial Technology Leak Out? ,"
Journal of Industrial Economics ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 34(2), pages 217-23, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Suzanne Scotchmer & Jerry Green, 1990.
"Novelty and Disclosure in Patent Law ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 131-146, Spring.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Jerry R. Green & Suzanne Scotchmer, 1995.
"On the Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(1), pages 20-33, Spring.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Wesley M. Cohen & Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, 2000.
"Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) ,"
NBER Working Papers
7552, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Langinier, Corinne, 2004.
"Using patents to mislead rivals ,"
Staff General Research Papers
11483, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
Other versions: Nancy T. Gallini, 1992.
"Patent Policy and Costly Imitation ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(1), pages 52-63, Spring.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Samuel Kortum & Josh Lerner, 1997.
"Stronger Protection or Technological Revolution: What is Behind the Recent Surge in Patenting? ,"
NBER Working Papers
6204, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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