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The Determinants of U.S. Labor Disputes

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  • Cramton, Peter C
  • Tracy, Joseph S

Abstract

The authors present a bargaining model of union contract negotiations in which the union decides between two threats: the union can strike or it can continue to work under the expired contract. The model makes predictions about the level of dispute activity and the form disputes take. Strike incidence increases as the strike threat becomes more attractive because of low unemployment or a real wage drop. The authors test these predictions by estimating logistic models of dispute incidence and dispute composition for negotiations from 1970 to 1989. They find support for the model's key predictions but these associations are weaker after 1981. Copyright 1994 by University of Chicago Press.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Labor Economics.

Volume (Year): 12 (1994)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 180-209

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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:12:y:1994:i:2:p:180-209

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References

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  1. Peter Cramton & Joseph S. Tracy, 1992. "Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data," Papers of Peter Cramton 92aer, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
  2. Tracy, Joseph S, 1987. "An Empirical Test of an Asymmetric Information Model of Strikes," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 5(2), pages 149-73, April.
  3. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 252, David K. Levine.
  4. Kennan, John & Wilson, Robert, 1989. "Strategic Bargaining Models and Interpretation of Strike Data," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 4(S), pages S87-130, Supplemen.
  5. McConnell, Sheena, 1989. "Strikes, Wages, and Private Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 801-15, September.
  6. Admati, Anat R & Perry, Motty, 1987. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(3), pages 345-64, July.
  7. Reder, Melvin W & Neumann, George R, 1980. "Conflict and Contract: The Case of Strikes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(5), pages 867-86, October.
  8. Card, David, 1990. "Strikes and Bargaining: A Survey of the Recent Empirical Literature," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 410-15, May.
  9. John M. Abowd & Joseph S. Tracy, 1988. "Market Structure, Strike Activity, and Union Wage Settlements," NBER Working Papers 2595, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. John M. Abowd & Richard B. Freeman, 1990. "The Internationalization of the U.S. Labor Market," NBER Working Papers 3321, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. John M. Abowd & Richard B. Freeman, 1991. "Immigration, Trade and the Labor Market," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number abow91-1.
  12. Michael L. Wachter & William H. Carter, 1989. "Norm Shifts in Union Wages: Will 1989 Be a Replay of 1969?," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 20(2), pages 233-276.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Kennan, John, 1995. "Repeated contract negotiations with private information," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 447-472, November.
  2. Danziger, Leif, 2008. "Extension of labor contracts and optimal backpay," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 18-36, February.
  3. van Ours, Jan C., 1999. "The cyclical behavior of holdout durations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 365-370, March.
  4. Malo, Miguel A. & Sanchez-sanchez, Nuria, 2011. "The legal form of labour conflicts and their time persistence: an empirical analysis with a large firms' panel," MPRA Paper 30117, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Louis Christofides & Amy Chen Peng, 2007. "Real Wage Chronologies," CESifo Working Paper Series 2096, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent & VERGARI, Cecilia, 2010. "Unions' relative concerns and strikes in wage bargaining," CORE Discussion Papers 2010076, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  7. MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent, 2005. "Market integration and strike activity," CORE Discussion Papers 2005036, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  8. Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2013. "Relative Concerns and Delays in Bargaining with Private Information," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(3), pages 329-338, June.
  9. MAULEON , Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J., . "Market competition and strike activity," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1658, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  10. Brooks, Richard & Landeo, Claudia & Spier, Kathryn, 2009. "Trigger Happy or Gun Shy? Dissolving Common-Value Partnerships with Texas Shootouts," Working Papers 2009-1, University of Alberta, Department of Economics, revised 01 Jul 2013.
  11. Danziger, Leif & Neuman, Shoshana, 2003. "Delays in Renewal of Labor Contracts: Theory and Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 709, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  12. Sergi Jimenez-Martin & José M. Labeaga & Mariluz Marco, 1996. "Algunos factores explicativos de la existencia de huelgas durante la negociación colectiva en España," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 20(2), pages 217-242, May.
  13. Hiroko Okudaira, 2009. "The Economic Costs of Court Decisions Concerning Dismissals in Japan: Identification by Judge Transfers," ISER Discussion Paper 0733, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  14. Peter Cramton & Joseph Tracy, 2003. "Unions, Bargaining and Strikes," Papers of Peter Cramton 02ubs, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 05 Sep 2002.
  15. Angur, Madhukar G. & Lotfi, Vahid & Sarkis, Joseph, 1996. "A hybrid conjoint measurement and bi-criteria model for a two group negotiation problem," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 195-206, September.

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