An Empirical Test of an Asymmetric Information Model of Strikes
AbstractRecent developments in the theory of strategic bargaining demonstrate how informational asymmetries can lead to prolonged and costly bargaining. The se models can be applied to contract negotiations, yielding an economic theory of strikes. To date, few empirical tests of these models have been carried out. In this paper, a set of predictions concerning the incidence and unconditional duration of strikes is derived from a simple bargaining model in which the union is uncertain about the firm's future profitability. These predictions are then tested on a micro data set of major U.S. contract negotiations that took place from 1973-77. Copyright 1987 by University of Chicago Press.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Labor Economics.
Volume (Year): 5 (1987)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JOLE/
Other versions of this item:
- Joseph S. Tracy, 1986. "An Empirical Test of an Asymmetric Information Model of Strikes," NBER Working Papers 1870, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Malo, Miguel A. & Sanchez-sanchez, Nuria, 2011. "The legal form of labour conflicts and their time persistence: an empirical analysis with a large firms' panel," MPRA Paper 30117, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Azam, Jean-Paul & Salmon, Claire, 2003.
"Strikes and Political Activism of Trade Unions: Theory and Application to Bangladesh,"
IDEI Working Papers
166, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Jean-Paul Azam & Claire Salmon, 2004. "Strikes and Political Activism of Trade Unions: Theory and Application to Bangladesh," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 119(3_4), pages 311-334, 06.
- Cramton, Peter C & Tracy, Joseph S, 1994.
"The Determinants of U.S. Labor Disputes,"
Journal of Labor Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(2), pages 180-209, April.
- Elie Appelbaum, 2004. "Union militancy and the probability of strikes," Working Papers 2004_4, York University, Department of Economics.
- L. J. Perry, 2005. "A Long-Term Perspective On Industrial Disputes In Australia: 1913–2003," Economic Papers, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 24(3), pages 263-279, 09.
- Alberto Casagrande & Marco Spallone, 2007. "Investigating the determinants of pretrial settlement rates: contingent versus non-contingent lawyersâ€™ fees," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 1-13, August.
- Babcock, Linda & Loewenstein, George & Wang, Xianghong, 1995. "The relationship between uncertainty, the contract zone, and efficiency in a bargaining experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 475-485, August.
- Ohkusa, Yasushi & Ohtake, Fumio, 1997.
"The Productivity Effects of Information Sharing, Profit Sharing, and ESOPs,"
Journal of the Japanese and International Economies,
Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 385-402, September.
- Ohkusa, Y & Ohtake, F, 1997. "The Productivity Effects of Information Sharing, Profit-Sharing and ESOPs," ISER Discussion Paper 0435, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, 1997. "Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(1), pages 109-126, Winter.
- Henry S. Farber & Max H. Bazerman, 1989. "Divergent Expectations as a Cause of Disagreement in Bargaining: Evidence from a Comparison of Arbitration Schemes."," NBER Working Papers 2139, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- John M. Abowd & George T. Milkovich & John M. Hannon, 1990.
"The effects of human resource management decisions on shareholder value,"
Industrial and Labor Relations Review,
ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 43(3), pages 203-236, February.
- John M. Abowd & George T. Milkovich & John M. Hannon, 1989. "The Effects of Human Resource Management Decisions on Shareholder Value," NBER Working Papers 3148, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Goerke, Laszlo & Schnabel, Claus, 2002. "On strike insurance," Discussion Papers 12, Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Chair of Labour and Regional Economics.
- Butter, F.A.G. den & Wijngaert, R.F., 1990. "Who is correcting the error? : a co-integration approach for wages, wage space and labour conflicts in the Netherlands," Serie Research Memoranda 0019, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics.
- James McDonald & Harry Bloch, 1999. "The Spillover Effects of Industrial Action on Firm Profitability," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 183-200, September.
- Lemke, Robert J., 2004. "Dynamic bargaining with action-dependent valuations," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 28(9), pages 1847-1875, July.
- Joseph S. Tracy, 1986. "Seniority Rules and the Gains from Union Organization," NBER Working Papers 2039, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- John M. Abowd & Joseph S. Tracy, 1988. "Market Structure, Strike Activity, and Union Wage Settlements," NBER Working Papers 2595, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- David Dickinson & Lynn Hunnicutt, 2010. "Nonbinding recommendations: the relative effects of focal points versus uncertainty reduction on bargaining outcomes," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(4), pages 615-634, October.
- David Dickinson & Lynn Hunnicutt, 2005. "Nonbinding Suggestions: The Relative Effects of Focal Points versus Uncertainty Reduction on Bargaining Outcomes," Working Papers 05-13, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.