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Rent Sharing in an Equilibrium Model of Matching and Turnover

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  • McLaughlin, Kenneth J
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    Abstract

    This article characterizes labor markets in which the heterogeneity of workers and firms results in thin markets and rents. Neoclassical marginal analysis and matching are blended into a computable general equilibrium model of trade in efficiency units of labor. Although workers' bargaining problems are interrelated, a simple wage contract generates wage flexibility and efficient matching in the model's equilibrium. Equilibrium wages are predicted to vary with the diversity of firms, the scarcity of skills, and the costliness of search. The model is applied to superstar markets, union bargaining in sports, interindustry wage differentials, and the relationship between pay and profit. Copyright 1994 by University of Chicago Press.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Labor Economics.

    Volume (Year): 12 (1994)
    Issue (Month): 4 (October)
    Pages: 499-523

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    Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:12:y:1994:i:4:p:499-523

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    Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JOLE/

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    Cited by:
    1. Dr Alex Bryson, 2012. "Why Are Migrants Paid More?," NIESR Discussion Papers 3209, National Institute of Economic and Social Research.
    2. Kuhn, Johan Moritz, 2007. "My Pay is Too Bad (I Quit). Your Pay is Too Good (You're Fired)," Working Papers 07-5, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics.
    3. Ireland, Norman & Merzoni, Guido, 1999. "Economic Integration And Human Capital Investment," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 534, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    4. Alexandre Léné, 2002. "Enterprise-related training and poaching externalities," Post-Print halshs-00150509, HAL.
    5. Kuckulenz, Anja, 2006. "Wage and Productivity Effect of Continuing Training in Germany: A Sectoral Analysis," ZEW Discussion Papers 06-25, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    6. Alexandre Léné, 2005. "Détournements de main-d'œuvre et externalités de la formation dans un modèle de concurrence imparfaite," Post-Print halshs-00150687, HAL.
    7. Anja Kuckulenz, 2006. "Wage and Productivity Effect of Continuing Training in Germany : A Sectoral Analysis," Working Papers of the Research Group Heterogenous Labor 06-06, Research Group Heterogeneous Labor, University of Konstanz/ZEW Mannheim.

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