Winner Take All in the NFL
AbstractIn an earlier paper, Kowalewski and Leeds showed that free agency and the salary cap brought profound changes to the level and nature of playersâ€™ salaries in the National Football League (NFL). Their study is limited, however, by the fact thatâ€”unlike most other professional athletesâ€”football players are evaluated by position-specific statistics. The authors improve on their earlier work by performing quantile regressions on data for specific positions to show how free agency and the salary cap affected compensation. They show that the new bargaining regime greatly increased the reward to performance.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by in its journal Journal of Sports Economics.
Volume (Year): 2 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
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