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Rent Sharing In An Equilibrium Model Of Matching And Turnover

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  • MCLAUGHLIN, K.J.

Abstract

This article characterizes labor markets in which the heterogeneity of workers and firms results in thin markets and rents. Neoclassical marginal analysis and matching are blended into a computable general equilibrium model of trade in efficiency units of labor. Although workers' bargaining problems are interrelated, a simple wage contract generates wage flexibility and efficient matching in the model's equilibrium. Equilibrium wages are predicted to vary with the diversity of firms, the scarcity of skills, and the costliness of search. The model is applied to superstar markets, union bargaining in sports, interindustry wage differentials, and the relationship between pay and profit. Copyright 1994 by University of Chicago Press.
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Suggested Citation

  • Mclaughlin, K.J., 1988. "Rent Sharing In An Equilibrium Model Of Matching And Turnover," RCER Working Papers 141, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    • Handle: RePEc:roc:rocher:141
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    Cited by:

    1. Leo Kahane, 2001. "Team and player effects on NHL player salaries: a hierarchical linear model approach," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(9), pages 629-632.
    2. Davis, Steven J., 1997. "Sorting, learning, and mobility when jobs have scarcity value : A comment," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 327-337, June.
    3. Alexandre Léné, 2002. "Enterprise-related training and poaching externalities," Post-Print halshs-00150509, HAL.
    4. Alex Bryson & Giambattista Rossi & Rob Simmons, 2012. "Why Are Migrants Paid More?," CEP Discussion Papers dp1134, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    5. Ireland, Norman & Merzoni, Guido, "undated". "Economic Integration and Human Capital Investment," Economic Research Papers 269255, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    6. McLaughlin, Kenneth J & Bils, Mark, 2001. "Interindustry Mobility and the Cyclical Upgrading of Labor," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(1), pages 94-135, January.
    7. Alex Bryson & Giambattista Rossi & Rob Simmons, 2014. "The Migrant Wage Premium in Professional Football: A Superstar Effect?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(1), pages 12-28, February.
    8. Alexandre Léné, 2005. "Détournements de main-d'œuvre et externalités de la formation dans un modèle de concurrence imparfaite," Post-Print halshs-00150687, HAL.
    9. Peter F. Orazem & Marvin L. Bouillon & Benjamin M. Doran, 2004. "Long‐Term Attachments and Long‐Run Firm Rates of Return," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 71(2), pages 314-333, October.
    10. Kuhn, Johan Moritz, 2007. "My Pay is Too Bad (I Quit). Your Pay is Too Good (You're Fired)," Working Papers 07-5, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics.
    11. Kuckulenz, Anja, 2006. "Wage and Productivity Effect of Continuing Training in Germany: A Sectoral Analysis," ZEW Discussion Papers 06-025, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    12. John L. Solow & Anthony C. Krautmann, 2011. "A Nash Bargaining Model of the Salaries of Elite Free Agents," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 12(3), pages 309-316, June.
    13. Isabelle Sin & Steven Stillman & Richard Fabling, 2017. "What drives the gender wage gap? Examining the roles of sorting, productivity differences, and discrimination," Motu Working Papers 17_15, Motu Economic and Public Policy Research.
    14. Michael A. Leeds & Sandra Kowalewski, 2001. "Winner Take All in the NFL," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 2(3), pages 244-256, August.
    15. Laura A Harvey & James Rockey, 2020. "The declining fortunes of (most) American workers," University of East Anglia School of Economics Working Paper Series 2020-04, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..

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