A Nash Bargaining Model of the Salaries of Elite Free Agents
In this paper, we focus on how rents are divided between an elite free agent and a team in a Nash bargaining framework. In order to find the Nash bargaining solution, we identify the threat points of the player and the team as the best alternative bargains that the player and the team could reach with another team and another player, respectively. We then extend the analysis to include a consideration of multiple teams potentially bidding for the free agentâ€™s services. In this section of the paper, we show that the playerâ€™s ultimate location and salary are determined by his marginal value over his replacement.
Volume (Year): 12 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
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