Optimal gate revenue sharing in sports leagues
Sports leagues constitute one of the few examples of legally operating cartels. In this paper I examine how gate revenue sharing may serve to coordinate talent investmentswithin these cartels. I show that sharing revenues has the potential to raise cartel profits, because it decreases the incentive to invest in playing talent. Leagues consisting of teams with heterogeneous local markets should share less revenues to maximize profits, whereas homogeneous teams should share more.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.cdes.fr/index.php?id=fr69|
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Stefan Szymanski & Stefan KÈsenne, 2004.
"Competitive balance and gate revenue sharing in team sports,"
Journal of Industrial Economics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(1), pages 165-177, 03.
- SZYMANSKI, Stefan & KÉSENNE, Stefan, 2003. "Competitive balance and gate revenue sharing in team sports," Working Papers 2003003, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
- Palomino, Frederic & Sakovics, Jozsef, 2004.
"Inter-league competition for talent vs. competitive balance,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 22(6), pages 783-797, June.
- Frederic Palomino & Jozsef Sakovics, 2003. "Inter-league competition for talent vs. competitive balance," ESE Discussion Papers 96, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- B Buraimo & D Forrest & R Simmons, 2004.
"Outcome uncertainty and the couch potato audience,"
542822, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
- Lawrence M. Kahn, 2007. "Markets: Cartel Behavior and Amateurism in College Sports," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(1), pages 209-226, Winter.
- El-Hodiri, Mohamed & Quirk, James, 1971. "An Economic Model of a Professional Sports League," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 79(6), pages 1302-19, Nov.-Dec..
- Donald G. Ferguson & J. C. H. Jones & Kenneth G. Stewart, 2000. "Competition Within A Cartel: League Conduct And Team Conduct In The Market For Baseball Player Services," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(3), pages 422-430, August.
- Eberhard Feess & Frank Stähler, 2009. "Revenue Sharing In Professional Sports Leagues," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 56(2), pages 255-265, 05.
- Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, 2010. "Is the Coach Paid too Much?: Coaching Salaries and the NCAA Cartel," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(3), pages 841-862, 09.
- PEETERS, Thomas, 2010.
"TV revenue sharing as a coordination device in sports,"
2010005, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
- Peeters, Thomas, 2012. "Media revenue sharing as a coordination device in sports leagues," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 153-163.
- Thomas Peeters, 2011. "TV Revenue Sharing as a Coordination Device in Sports Leagues," Working Papers 1109, International Association of Sports Economists;North American Association of Sports Economists.
- Szymanski, Stefan, 2001. "Income Inequality, Competitive Balance and the Attractiveness of Team Sports: Some Evidence and a Natural Experiment from English Soccer," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(469), pages F69-84, February.
- Scott E. Atkinson & Linda R. Stanley & John Tschirhart, 1988. "Revenue Sharing as an Incentive in an Agency Problem: An example from the National Football League," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 27-43, Spring.
- Rodney Fort & James Quirk, 1995. "Cross-subsidization, Incentives, and Outcomes in Professional Team Sports Leagues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 33(3), pages 1265-1299, September.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spe:wpaper:1122. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Victor Matheson)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.