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Is the Coach Paid too Much?: Coaching Salaries and the NCAA Cartel

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  • Amy Farmer
  • Paul Pecorino

Abstract

Recently, a great deal of controversy has been generated from the salaries earned by head coaches in the NCAA. Although many figures in the world of sports earn high salaries, one important difference in the case of the NCAA is that the players do not get paid. We develop a model that shows that a cartel agreement to not pay the players raises the coach's salary if some players choose where to play based on the identity of the coach. The agreement not to pay the players improves competitive balance in the baseline model, but this result does not generalize.

Suggested Citation

  • Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, 2010. "Is the Coach Paid too Much?: Coaching Salaries and the NCAA Cartel," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(3), pages 841-862, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:19:y:2010:i:3:p:841-862
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2010.00271.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Peeters, 2015. "Profit-Maximizing Gate Revenue Sharing In Sports Leagues," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 53(2), pages 1275-1291, April.
    2. Thomas Peeters, 2011. "Optimal gate revenue sharing in sports leagues," Working Papers 1122, International Association of Sports Economists;North American Association of Sports Economists.
    3. Stacey L. Brook, 2021. "A Comparison of NCAA FBS Head Coaches Salary Determination From New and Modified Contracts," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 22(5), pages 491-513, June.
    4. Kelly M. Hastings & Frank Stephenson, 2015. "The NBA’s Maximum Player Salary and the Distribution of Player Rents," IJFS, MDPI, vol. 3(2), pages 1-9, March.
    5. Gary J. Colbert & E. Woodrow Eckard, 2015. "Do Colleges Get What They Pay For? Evidence on Football Coach Pay and Team Performance," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 16(4), pages 335-352, May.
    6. Kurt Rotthoff & Ann Mayo, 2010. "Coaching Costs As Tullock Costs: A Model Of Rising Coaching Salaries," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(3), pages 65-69, October.
    7. Brad R. Humphreys & Jane E. Ruseski, 2024. "Football-Generated Rent Sharing and Expenditures on Women’s Intercollegiate Athletics," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 25(8), pages 919-931, December.
    8. Mirabile, McDonald & Witte, Mark, 2012. "Can schools buy success in college football? Coach compensation, expenditures and performance," MPRA Paper 40642, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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