Enterprise-related training and poaching externalities
Labour poaching is a potential problem in work-linked training systems. Once trained, young people can be poached by rival firms, which threatened the training firm's investment. A distinction is made between two types of workforce poaching. It is shown that it may be rational for some firms to train young people, even if they then lose part of their workforce. However, this situation is not socially optimal: it does not exclude underinvestment or skilled labour shortages. This may justify government intervention. However, the introduction of subsidies can have perverse effects.
|Date of creation:||Sep 2002|
|Publication status:||Published in 14th European Association of Labour Economists Conference, Sep 2002, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, France. 2002|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00150509|
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