Enterprise-related training and poaching externalities
Labour poaching is a potential problem in work-linked training systems. Once trained, young people can be poached by rival firms, which threatened the training firm's investment. A distinction is made between two types of workforce poaching. It is shown that it may be rational for some firms to train young people, even if they then lose part of their workforce. However, this situation is not socially optimal: it does not exclude underinvestment or skilled labour shortages. This may justify government intervention. However, the introduction of subsidies can have perverse effects.
|Date of creation:||Sep 2002|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in 14th European Association of Labour Economists Conference, Sep 2002, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, France. 2002|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00150509|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Loewenstein, Mark A & Spletzer, James R, 1998. "Dividing the Costs and Returns to General Training," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 142-71, January.
- Daron Acemoglu & Joern-Steffen Pischke, 1999.
"Certification of Training and Training Outcomes,"
99-28, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Lindbeck, Assar & Snower, Dennis J, 2000.
"Multitask Learning and the Reorganization of Work: From Tayloristic to Holistic Organization,"
Journal of Labor Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 353-76, July.
- Lindbeck, Assar & Snower, Dennis J., 1999. "Multi-Task Learning and the Reorganization of Work. From Tayloristic to Holistic Organization," IZA Discussion Papers 39, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Margaret Stevens, 1999.
"Should Firms be Required to Pay for Vocational Training?,"
Economics Series Working Papers
1999-W04, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Stevens, Margaret, 2001. "Should Firms Be Required to Pay for Vocational Training?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(473), pages 485-505, July.
- Stevens, M., 1999. "Should Firms be Required to Pay for Vocational Training?," Economics Papers 1999-w4, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- Stevens, Margaret, 1999. "Should Firms be Required to Pay for Vocational Training?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2099, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- McLaughlin, Kenneth J, 1994. "Rent Sharing in an Equilibrium Model of Matching and Turnover," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(4), pages 499-523, October.
- Kathryn L. Shaw, 1985. "Occupational change, employer change, and the transferability of skills," Working Paper Series / Economic Activity Section 55, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- repec:nbr:nberbk:beck75-1 is not listed on IDEAS
- Sattinger, Michael, 1979. "Differential Rents and the Distribution of Earnings," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 31(1), pages 60-71, March.
- David Soskice, 1994. "Reconciling Markets and Institutions: The German Apprenticeship System," NBER Chapters, in: Training and the Private Sector: International Comparisons, pages 25-60 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Rosen, Sherwin, 1987. "Some Economics of Teaching," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 5(4), pages 561-75, October.
- repec:oup:restud:v:54:y:1987:i:2:p:243-55 is not listed on IDEAS
- Feuer, M. & Glick, H. & Desai, A., 1987. "Is firm-sponsored education viable?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 121-136, March.
- Booth, Alison L & Satchell, Stephen E, 1994. "Apprenticeships and Job Tenure," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(4), pages 676-95, October.
- Hilderth, A.K. & Oswald, A.J., 1993.
"Rent-Sharing and Wages: Evidence form Company and Establishment Panels,"
Economics Series Working Papers
99154, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Hildreth, Andrew K G & Oswald, Andrew J, 1997. "Rent-Sharing and Wages: Evidence from Company and Establishment Panels," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(2), pages 318-37, April.
- Picard, Pierre M., 2001. "Job additionality and deadweight spending in perfectly competitive industries: the case for optimal employment subsidies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 521-541, March.
- Booth, Alison L & Chatterji, Monojit, 1998. "Unions and Efficient Training," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(447), pages 328-43, March.
- Pierre Cahuc & Patrick Sevestre & Hélène Zajdela, 1990. "Négociations salariales et segmentation du marché du travail," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 92(1), pages 43-50.
- Stevens, Margaret, 1994. "A Theoretical Model of On-the-Job Training with Imperfect Competition," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(4), pages 537-62, October.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00150509. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.