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The financing of apprenticeship training in the light of labor market regulations

  • Muehlemann, Samuel
  • Pfeifer, Harald
  • Walden, Günter
  • Wenzelmann, Felix
  • Wolter, Stefan C.

In this paper we analyze the training behavior of firms in Germany and Switzerland -- two countries with a comparable apprenticeship system but strong differences in the regulation of their respective labor markets. We make use of two representative firm-level surveys on the provision of apprenticeship training to analyze differences in the costs and benefits of training and the firm's training decision. Our results suggest that firms are more likely to make a substantial (short-term) net investment in apprenticeship training in the presence of strong employment protection laws.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Labour Economics.

Volume (Year): 17 (2010)
Issue (Month): 5 (October)
Pages: 799-809

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Handle: RePEc:eee:labeco:v:17:y:2010:i:5:p:799-809
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  19. Katz, Eliakim & Ziderman, Adrian, 1990. "Investment in General Training: The Role of Information and Labour Mobility," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(403), pages 1147-58, December.
  20. Samuel Muehlemann & Juerg Schweri & Rainer Winkelmann & Stefan C. Wolter, 2007. "An Empirical Analysis of the Decision to Train Apprentices," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 21(3), pages 419-441, 09.
  21. Majumdar, Sumon, 2007. "Market conditions and worker training: How does it affect and whom?," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 1-23, January.
  22. Regina Dionisius & Samuel Muehlemann & Harald Pfeifer & Günter Walden & Felix Wenzelmann & Stefan C. Wolter, 2008. "Cost and Benefit of Apprenticeship Training – A Comparison of Germany and Switzerland," CESifo Working Paper Series 2287, CESifo Group Munich.
  23. Chang, Chun & Wang, Yijiang, 1996. "Human Capital Investment under Asymmetric Information: The Pigovian Conjecture Revisited," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(3), pages 505-19, July.
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  27. Christian Dustmann & Uta Schönberg, 2007. "Apprenticeship Training and Commitment to Training Provision," Economics of Education Working Paper Series 0032, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU).
  28. Dustmann, Christian & Schönberg, Uta, 2004. "Training and Union Wages," IZA Discussion Papers 1435, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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