Behavioral Effects of Probation Periods: An Analysis of Worker Absenteeism / Anreizeffekte der Probezeit: Eine Untersuchung von Fehlzeiten bei Arbeitnehmern
This is the first study to provide robust empirical foundations to a theoretical literature which so far had to assume behavioral adjustments in response to probation periods. Probation periods typically precede regular employment contracts and are commonly interpreted as a screening device for employers. During probation employees have an incentive to behave according to the expectations of employers, because in this time they can easily be laid off. Also, salaries are frequently renegotiated after probation periods. Thus it is hypothesized that "bad" workers attempt to mimick "good" workers during probation. The incentive for such mimicking behavior disappears as soon as the probation period terminates and the formal employment contract is signed.
Volume (Year): 221 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Eng Seng Loh, 1994. "Employment Probation as a Sorting Mechanism," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 47(3), pages 471-486, April.
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- Asha Sadanand & Venkatraman Sadanand & Denton Marks, 1989. "Probationary Contracts in Agencies with Bilateral Asymmetric Information," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 22(3), pages 643-61, August.
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