The Effect of Employment Protection on Worker Effort: A Comparison of Absenteeism During and After Probation
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- Ichino, Andrea & Riphahn, Regina T., 2001. "The Effect of Employment Protection on Worker Effort: A Comparison of Absenteeism During and After Probation," IZA Discussion Papers 385, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Andrea Ichino & Regina T. Riphahn, 2001. "The Effect of Employment Protection on Worker Effort. A Comparison of Absenteeism During and After Probation," CESifo Working Paper Series 596, CESifo Group Munich.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywordsabsenteeism; employment protection; probation; worker effort;
- J38 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Public Policy
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-LAB-2003-07-13 (Labour Economics)
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