IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/iaa/wpaper/201604.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Sick Pay Reforms and Health Status in a Unionised Labour Market

Author

Listed:
  • Laszlo Goerke

    () (Institute for Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union, University of Trier)

Abstract

We theoretically analyse the effects of sick pay and employees' health on collective bargaining, assuming that individuals determine absence optimally. If sick pay is set by the government and not paid for by firms, it induces the trade union to lower wages. This mitigates the positive impact on absence. Moreover, a union may oppose higher sick pay if it reduces labour supply sufficiently.Better employee health tends to foster wage demands. If the union determines both wages and sick pay, we identify situations in which it will substitute wages for sick pay because adverse absence effects can be mitigated.

Suggested Citation

  • Laszlo Goerke, 2016. "Sick Pay Reforms and Health Status in a Unionised Labour Market," IAAEG Discussion Papers until 2011 201604, Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU).
  • Handle: RePEc:iaa:wpaper:201604
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://iaaeu.de/images/DiscussionPaper/2016_04.pdf
    File Function: Revised version, 2016
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. García-Serrano, Carlos & Malo, Miguel A., 2009. "The impact of union direct voice on voluntary and involuntary absenteeism," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 372-383, March.
    2. Andrea Ichino & Giovanni Maggi, 2000. "Work Environment and Individual Background: Explaining Regional Shirking Differentials in a Large Italian Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 115(3), pages 1057-1090.
    3. Goerke, Laszlo & Pannenberg, Markus, 2015. "Trade union membership and sickness absence: Evidence from a sick pay reform," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 13-25.
    4. Assar Lindbeck & Mårten Palme & Mats Persson, 2016. "Sickness Absence and Local Benefit Cultures," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 118(1), pages 49-78, January.
    5. Oswald, Andrew J, 1985. " The Economic Theory of Trade Unions: An Introductory Survey," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 87(2), pages 160-193.
    6. Andrews, M J & Simmons, R, 2001. "Friday May Never Be the Same Again: Some Results on Work-Sharing from Union-Firm Bargaining Models," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 48(5), pages 488-516, November.
    7. Wehke, Sven, 2009. "Union wages, hours of work and the effectiveness of partial coordination agreements," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 89-96, January.
    8. Johansson, Per & Palme, Marten, 2005. "Moral hazard and sickness insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1879-1890, September.
    9. Lusine Lusinyan & Leo Bonato, 2007. "Work Absence in Europe," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 54(3), pages 475-538, July.
    10. Hansen, Jørgen Drud & Molana, Hassan & Montagna, Catia & Nielsen, Jørgen Ulff-Møller, 2012. "Work hours, social value of leisure and globalisation," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 317-326.
    11. Ziebarth, Nicolas R., 2013. "Long-term absenteeism and moral hazard—Evidence from a natural experiment," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 277-292.
    12. Böckerman, Petri & Bryson, Alex & Ilmakunnas, Pekka, 2012. "Does high involvement management improve worker wellbeing?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 660-680.
    13. Jessica Primoff Vistnes, 1997. "Gender Differences in Days Lost from Work Due to Illness," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 50(2), pages 304-323, January.
    14. Jingye Shi & Mikal Skuterud, 2012. "Gone Fishing! Reported Sickness Absenteeism and the Weather," Working Papers 1208, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2012.
    15. Martin Halla & Susanne Pech & Martina Zweimüller, 2015. "The Effect of Statutory Sick Pay Regulations on Workers’ Health," CDL Aging, Health, Labor working papers 1504, The Christian Doppler (CD) Laboratory Aging, Health, and the Labor Market, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
    16. Leigh, J. Paul, 1991. "Employee and job attributes as predictors of absenteeism in a national sample of workers: The importance of health and dangerous working conditions," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 127-137, January.
    17. Petri Böckerman & Alex Bryson & Pekka Ilmakunnas, 2013. "Does high involvement management lead to higher pay?," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 176(4), pages 861-885, October.
    18. Ose, Solveig Osborg, 2005. "Working conditions, compensation and absenteeism," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 161-188, January.
    19. Georges Dionne & Benoit Dostie, 2007. "New Evidence on the Determinants of Absenteeism Using Linked Employer-Employee Data," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 61(1), pages 108-120, October.
    20. Barmby, Tim & Sessions, John G & Treble, John G, 1994. " Absenteeism, Efficiency Wages and Shirking," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 96(4), pages 561-566.
    21. Arne Mastekaasa, 2013. "Unionization and Certified Sickness Absence: Norwegian Evidence," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 66(1), pages 117-141, January.
    22. Leigh, J. Paul, 1985. "The effects of unemployment and the business cycle on absenteeism," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 159-170, May.
    23. Steven G. Allen, 1984. "Trade Unions, Absenteeism, and Exit-Voice," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 37(3), pages 331-345, April.
    24. Allen, Steven G, 1981. "An Empirical Model of Work Attendance," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 63(1), pages 77-87, February.
    25. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-444, June.
    26. Booth, Alison & Schiantarelli, Fabio, 1987. "The Employment Effects of a Shorter Working Week," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 54(214), pages 237-248, May.
    27. Patrik Hesselius & Per Johansson & Johan Vikström, 2013. "Social Behaviour in Work Absence," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 115(4), pages 995-1019, October.
    28. Calmfors, Lars, 1985. "Work sharing, employment and wages," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 293-309.
    29. Jody Heymann & Hye Jin Rho & John Schmitt & Alison Earle, 2009. "Contagion Nation: A Comparison of Paid Sick Day Policies in 22 Countries," CEPR Reports and Issue Briefs 2009-19, Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Absence; employment; sick pay; trade union; wage determination;

    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
    • J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iaa:wpaper:201604. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Adrian Chadi). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/iaaegde.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.