IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cje/issued/v22y1989i3p643-61.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Probationary Contracts in Agencies with Bilateral Asymmetric Information

Author

Listed:
  • Asha Sadanand
  • Venkatraman Sadanand
  • Denton Marks

Abstract

This paper examines a two-period principal and agent model where the agent's ability level is not observable to the principal and revealed to the agent only after the contract is signed. The value of the agent's output to the principal is affected by the agent's collegiality, which is unknown to the agent, but is observed by the principal. In these circumstances, with risk-neutral agents, the principal prefers a "probationary scheme" with second-period rehiring based on satisfactory first-period performance. Multiple equilibria results from this problem. However, the refinements literature provides a resolution to the multiplicity. Under certain conditions, the agent is rehired for sufficiently high first-period output; the superior agent will work harder in the first period than under recontracting, and the inferior-type agent will work less hard. The probationary scheme is shown to be Pareto superior to standard recontracting.

Suggested Citation

  • Asha Sadanand & Venkatraman Sadanand & Denton Marks, 1989. "Probationary Contracts in Agencies with Bilateral Asymmetric Information," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 22(3), pages 643-661, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:22:y:1989:i:3:p:643-61
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0008-4085%28198908%2922%3A3%3C643%3APCIAWB%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4
    Download Restriction: only available to JSTOR subscribers

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paul A. Samuelson, 2011. "The Collected Scientific Papers of Paul Samuelson," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 7, number 0262015749 edited by Janice Murray.
    2. repec:cup:apsrev:v:60:y:1966:i:01:p:29-38_12 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. R. M. Cyert & M. H. DeGroot, 1970. "Multiperiod Decision Models with Alternating Choice as a Solution to the Duopoly Problem," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 410-429.
    4. J. W. Friedman, 1968. "Reaction Functions and the Theory of Duopoly," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 35(3), pages 257-272.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Riphahn Regina T. & Thalmaier Anja, 2001. "Behavioral Effects of Probation Periods: An Analysis of Worker Absenteeism / Anreizeffekte der Probezeit: Eine Untersuchung von Fehlzeiten bei Arbeitnehmern," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 221(2), pages 179-201, April.
    2. Glazer, Amihai, 2012. "Up-or-out policies when a worker imitates another," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 432-438.
    3. Riphahn, Regina T. & Thalmaier, Anja, 1999. "Behavioral Effects of Probation Periods: An Analysis of Worker Absenteeism," IZA Discussion Papers 67, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    4. Ichino, Andrea & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2008. "How often should you open the door?: Optimal monitoring to screen heterogeneous agents," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(3-4), pages 820-831, September.
    5. Sami, Hind, 2009. "Random monitoring in financing relationships," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, pages 239-252.
    6. Fredrik Andersson, 2001. "Adverse selection and bilateral asymmetric information," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 74(2), pages 173-195, June.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:22:y:1989:i:3:p:643-61. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Prof. Werner Antweiler). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/ceaaaea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.