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Poaching and firm-sponsored training: First clean evidence

  • Mohrenweiser, Jens
  • Zwick, Thomas
  • Backes-Gellner, Uschi

A series of seminal theoretical papers argues that poaching of employees may hamper company-sponsored general training. However, the extent of poaching, its determinants and consequences, remains an open empirical question. We provide a novel empirical identification strategy for poaching and investigate its causes and consequences. We find that only a small number of training firms in Germany are poaching victims. Firms are more likely to poach employees during an economic downturn. Training firms respond to poaching by lowering the share of new apprentice intakes in the following years.

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Paper provided by ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research in its series ZEW Discussion Papers with number 13-037.

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Date of creation: 2013
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:13037
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  1. Uschi Backes-Gellner & Yvonne Oswald, 2012. "Learning for a bonus: How financial incentives interact with preferences," Economics of Education Working Paper Series 0079, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU).
  2. Picchio, Matteo & van Ours, Jan C, 2010. "Market imperfections and firm-sponsored training," CEPR Discussion Papers 7881, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Stevens, M., 1999. "Should Firms be Required to Pay for Vocational Training?," Economics Papers 1999-w4, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  4. Kathrin Göggel & Thomas Zwick, 2012. "Heterogeneous Wage Effects of Apprenticeship Training," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 114(3), pages 756-779, 09.
  5. Cottini, Elena & Kato, Takao & Westergaard-Nielsen, Niels, 2011. "Adverse workplace conditions, high-involvement work practices and labor turnover: Evidence from Danish linked employer–employee data," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 872-880.
  6. Lisa B. Kahn, 2013. "Asymmetric Information between Employers," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 165-205, October.
  7. Paul Ryan & Uschi Backes-Gellner & Silvia Teuber & Karin Wagner, 2012. "Apprentice pay in Britain, Germany and Switzerland: institutions, market forces, market power," Economics of Education Working Paper Series 0075, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU).
  8. Acemoglu, Daron & Pischke, Jörn-Steffen, 1996. "Why do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 1460, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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  11. Daron Acemoglu & Joern-Steffen Pischke, 1998. "Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labor Markets," Working papers 98-12, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  12. Jaeyong Song & Paul Almeida & Geraldine Wu, 2003. "Learning--by--Hiring: When Is Mobility More Likely to Facilitate Interfirm Knowledge Transfer?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 49(4), pages 351-365, April.
  13. Culpepper, Pepper D, 1999. "The Future of the High-Skill Equilibrium in Germany," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 43-59, Spring.
  14. Espen R. Moen & �sa Rosén, 2004. "Does Poaching Distort Training?," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(4), pages 1143-1162.
  15. W. Smits, 2006. "The Quality of Apprenticeship Training," Education Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(3), pages 329-344.
  16. Mohrenweiser, Jens & Zwick, Thomas, 2008. "Why Do Firms Train Apprentices? The Net Cost Puzzle Reconsidered," ZEW Discussion Papers 08-019, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  17. Bassanini, Andrea & Booth, Alison L. & Brunello, Giorgio & De Paola, Maria & Leuven, Edwin, 2005. "Workplace Training in Europe," IZA Discussion Papers 1640, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  18. Finegold, David & Soskice, David, 1988. "The Failure of Training in Britain: Analysis and Prescription," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(3), pages 21-53, Autumn.
  19. Alison L. Booth & Mark L. Bryan, 2005. "Testing Some Predictions of Human Capital Theory: New Training Evidence from Britain," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 87(2), pages 391-394, May.
  20. John M. Barron & Mark C. Berger & Dan A. Black, 1999. "Do Workers Pay for On-The-Job Training?," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 34(2), pages 235-252.
  21. Mark A. Loewenstein & James R. Spletzer, 1999. "General and Specific Training: Evidence and Implications," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 34(4), pages 710-733.
  22. Uschi Backes-Gellner & Simone N. Tuor, 2010. "Avoiding Labor Shortages by Employer Signaling: On the Importance of Good Work Climate and Labor Relations," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 63(2), pages 271-286, January.
  23. Hélène Zajdela & Patrick Sevestre & Pierre Cahuc, 1990. "Négociations salariales et segmentation du marché du travail," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 92(1), pages 43-50.
  24. Stevens, Margaret, 1994. "A Theoretical Model of On-the-Job Training with Imperfect Competition," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(4), pages 537-62, October.
  25. Acemoglu, Daron & Pischke, Jorn-Steffen, 2000. "Certification of training and training outcomes," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 917-927, May.
  26. Flinn, Christopher J, 1986. "Wages and Job Mobility of Young Workers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages S88-S110, June.
  27. Edwin Leuven, 2005. "The Economics of Private Sector Training: A Survey of the Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(1), pages 91-111, 02.
  28. Wagner, Robert & Zwick, Thomas, 2012. "How acid are lemons? Adverse selection and signalling for skilled labour market entrants," ZEW Discussion Papers 12-014, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  29. John M. Barron & Mark C. Berger & Dan A. Black, 2006. "Selective Counteroffers," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 385-410, July.
  30. Edward P. Lazear, 2009. "Firm-Specific Human Capital: A Skill-Weights Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 117(5), pages 914-940, October.
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