IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/prs/ecoprv/ecop_0249-4744_1990_num_92_1_5156.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Négociations salariales et segmentation du marché du travail

Author

Listed:
  • Pierre Cahuc
  • Patrick Sevestre
  • Hélène Zajdela

Abstract

[eng] Wage Negotiation and the Segmentation of the Job Market, . by Pierre Cahuc, Patrick Sevestre, Hélène Zajdela.. . This paper deals with a model for wage negotiation to explain why the job market is segmented. On the grounds of the non-cooperative games theory, a model is developed. It enables to distinguish different modes of wage setting depending on whether or not wage earners can hope for wages higher than market wages and on whether the firms' performance is good or bad. The model was tested on a sample of 334 French manufacturing firms over the 1974-1983 period. The estimates seem to confirm that both this model and the typology of firms involved therewith are relevant. [fre] Négociations salariales et segmentation du marché du travail, . par Pierre Cahuc, Patrick Sevestre, Hélène Zajdela.. . Cet article propose un modèle de négociations salariales susceptible d'expliquer la segmentation du marché du travail. A l'aide de la théorie des jeux non-coopératifs, on spécifie un modèle qui permet de distinguer différents modes de détermination des salaires selon que les salariés peuvent ou non espérer obtenir un salaire plus élevé que le salaire de marché et selon que les performances de l'entreprise sont bonnes ou mauvaises. Le modèle proposé est testé sur un échantillon de 334 entreprises industrielles françaises observées sur la période 1974-1983. Les estimations obtenues semblent confirmer la pertinence du modèle et de la typologie des entreprises qui lui est associée. [ger] Lohnverhandlungen und Arbeitsmarktsegmentation, . von Pierre Cahuc, Patrick Sevestre, Hélène Zajdela.. . Dieser Artikel schlägt ein Lohnverhandlungsmodell vor.das geeignet ist, die Arbeitsmarktsegmentation zu erklären. Mit Hilfe der Spieltheorie nicht-kooperativer Verhaltensweisen wird ein Modell aufgestellt, das verschiedene Bemessungsweisen für die Löhne zu unterscheiden erlaubt, je nachdem ob die Lohnempfänger Löhne, die höher als die Marktlöhne sind, erhoffen können oder nicht, und je nachdem ob die Leistungsfähigkeit des Unternehmens gut oder schlecht ist. Das vorgeschlagene Modell wird mittels einer Stichprobenerhebung von 334 französischen Industriebetrieben getestet, die im Zeitraum von 1974 bis 1983 beobachtet wurden. Die Schätzergebnisse scheinen die Relevanz des Modells sowie die ihm korrelierte Typologie der Unternehmen zu bestätigen. [spa] Negociaciones salariales y segmentación del mercado de trabajo, . por Pierre Cahuc, Patrick Sevestre, Hélène Zajdela.. . El presente artículo propone un modelo de negociaciones salariales capaz de explicar la segmentación del mercado de trabajo. Mediante la teoría de los juegos no-cooperativos, se especifica un modelo que permite distinguir diferentes modos de determinación de salarios teniendo en cuenta que los asalariados pueden o no obtener un salario más elevado que el salario del mercado y según los resultados de la empresa. El modelo propuesto se ensaya sobre una muestra de 334 empresas industriales francesas observadas en el período 1974-1983. Las estimaciones que se obtienen parecen confirmar la pertinencia del modelo y de la tipología de las empresas correspondientes.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre Cahuc & Patrick Sevestre & Hélène Zajdela, 1990. "Négociations salariales et segmentation du marché du travail," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 92(1), pages 43-50.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_1990_num_92_1_5156
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.1990.5156
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.3406/ecop.1990.5156
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://www.persee.fr/doc/ecop_0249-4744_1990_num_92_1_5156
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Ian M. McDonald & Robert M. Solow, 1985. "Wages and Employment in a Segmented Labor Market," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1115-1141.
    3. Olivier J. Blanchard & Lawrence H. Summers, 1986. "Hysteresis and the European Unemployment Problem," NBER Chapters,in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1986, Volume 1, pages 15-90 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Solow, Robert M, 1985. " Insiders and Outsiders in Wage Determination," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 87(2), pages 411-428.
    5. McDonald, Ian M & Solow, Robert M, 1981. "Wage Bargaining and Employment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(5), pages 896-908, December.
    6. Lindbeck, Assar & Snower, Dennis J, 1985. "Explanations of Unemployment," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(2), pages 34-59, Summer.
    7. Lindbeck, Assar & Snower, Dennis J., 1987. "Efficiency wages versus insiders and outsiders," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-2), pages 407-416.
    8. John Sutton, 1986. "Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(5), pages 709-724.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Mohrenweiser, Jens & Zwick, Thomas & Backes-Gellner, Uschi, 2013. "Poaching and firm-sponsored training: First clean evidence," ZEW Discussion Papers 13-037, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    2. Alexandre Léné, 2000. "Le fragile équilibre de la formation en alternance," Post-Print halshs-00150471, HAL.
    3. Pierre Cahuc, 1990. "La théorie des négociations salariales : une revue de la littérature," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 92(1), pages 21-30.
    4. Alexandre Léné, 2002. "Enterprise-related training and poaching externalities," Post-Print halshs-00150509, HAL.
    5. Frosch, Katharina & Göbel, Christian & Zwick, Thomas, 2011. "Separating wheat and chaff: age-specific staffing strategies and innovative performance at the firm level
      [Den Weizen von der Spreu trennen: Altersbezogene Personalpolitik und Innovationen auf der
      ," ZEW Discussion Papers 11-047, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    6. Magali Jaoul-Grammare, 2011. "L’évolution de la segmentation du marché du travail en France : 1973-2007," Working Papers of BETA 2011-08, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    7. François Legendre, 1999. "Qu'a-t-on appris sur le lien salaire/ emploi grâce à l'économétrie ?," Cahiers d'Économie Politique, Programme National Persée, vol. 34(1), pages 221-255.
    8. Patrick Artus & Moncef Kaabi, 1994. "Comment limiter les méfaits des marchés internes du travail," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 45(3), pages 369-384.
    9. Hélène Zajdela, 1990. "Le dualisme du marché du travail : enjeux et fondements théoriques," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 92(1), pages 31-42.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_1990_num_92_1_5156. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Equipe PERSEE). General contact details of provider: https://www.persee.fr/collection/ecop .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.