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Négociations salariales et segmentation du marché du travail

Listed author(s):
  • Pierre Cahuc
  • Patrick Sevestre
  • Hélène Zajdela

[eng] Wage Negotiation and the Segmentation of the Job Market, by Pierre Cahuc, Patrick Sevestre, Hélène Zajdela. This paper deals with a model for wage negotiation to explain why the job market is segmented. On the grounds of the non-cooperative games theory, a model is developed. It enables to distinguish different modes of wage setting depending on whether or not wage earners can hope for wages higher than market wages and on whether the firms' performance is good or bad. The model was tested on a sample of 334 French manufacturing firms over the 1974-1983 period. The estimates seem to confirm that both this model and the typology of firms involved therewith are relevant. [fre] Négociations salariales et segmentation du marché du travail, par Pierre Cahuc, Patrick Sevestre, Hélène Zajdela. Cet article propose un modèle de négociations salariales susceptible d'expliquer la segmentation du marché du travail. A l'aide de la théorie des jeux non-coopératifs, on spécifie un modèle qui permet de distinguer différents modes de détermination des salaires selon que les salariés peuvent ou non espérer obtenir un salaire plus élevé que le salaire de marché et selon que les performances de l'entreprise sont bonnes ou mauvaises. Le modèle proposé est testé sur un échantillon de 334 entreprises industrielles françaises observées sur la période 1974-1983. Les estimations obtenues semblent confirmer la pertinence du modèle et de la typologie des entreprises qui lui est associée. [ger] Lohnverhandlungen und Arbeitsmarktsegmentation, von Pierre Cahuc, Patrick Sevestre, Hélène Zajdela. Dieser Artikel schlägt ein Lohnverhandlungsmodell vor.das geeignet ist, die Arbeitsmarktsegmentation zu erklären. Mit Hilfe der Spieltheorie nicht-kooperativer Verhaltensweisen wird ein Modell aufgestellt, das verschiedene Bemessungsweisen für die Löhne zu unterscheiden erlaubt, je nachdem ob die Lohnempfänger Löhne, die höher als die Marktlöhne sind, erhoffen können oder nicht, und je nachdem ob die Leistungsfähigkeit des Unternehmens gut oder schlecht ist. Das vorgeschlagene Modell wird mittels einer Stichprobenerhebung von 334 französischen Industriebetrieben getestet, die im Zeitraum von 1974 bis 1983 beobachtet wurden. Die Schätzergebnisse scheinen die Relevanz des Modells sowie die ihm korrelierte Typologie der Unternehmen zu bestätigen. [spa] Negociaciones salariales y segmentación del mercado de trabajo, por Pierre Cahuc, Patrick Sevestre, Hélène Zajdela. El presente artículo propone un modelo de negociaciones salariales capaz de explicar la segmentación del mercado de trabajo. Mediante la teoría de los juegos no-cooperativos, se especifica un modelo que permite distinguir diferentes modos de determinación de salarios teniendo en cuenta que los asalariados pueden o no obtener un salario más elevado que el salario del mercado y según los resultados de la empresa. El modelo propuesto se ensaya sobre una muestra de 334 empresas industriales francesas observadas en el período 1974-1983. Las estimaciones que se obtienen parecen confirmar la pertinencia del modelo y de la tipología de las empresas correspondientes.

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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Économie & prévision.

Volume (Year): 92 (1990)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 43-50

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Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_1990_num_92_1_5156
Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.1990.5156
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  1. Olivier J. Blanchard & Lawrence H. Summers, 1986. "Hysteresis and the European Unemployment Problem," NBER Chapters,in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1986, Volume 1, pages 15-90 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
  3. Lindbeck, Assar & Snower, Dennis J, 1985. "Explanations of Unemployment," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(2), pages 34-59, Summer.
  4. Lindbeck, Assar & Snower, Dennis J., 1987. "Efficiency wages versus insiders and outsiders," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-2), pages 407-416.
  5. Ian M. McDonald & Robert M. Solow, 1985. "Wages and Employment in a Segmented Labor Market," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1115-1141.
  6. John Sutton, 1986. "Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(5), pages 709-724.
  7. Solow, Robert M, 1985. " Insiders and Outsiders in Wage Determination," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 87(2), pages 411-428.
  8. McDonald, Ian M & Solow, Robert M, 1981. "Wage Bargaining and Employment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(5), pages 896-908, December.
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