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La théorie des négociations salariales : une revue de la littérature

Listed author(s):
  • Pierre Cahuc

[spa] La teoría de las negociaciones salariales :un examen de lo publicado, por Pierre Cahuc. En el présente artículo se exponen los desarrollos recientes de lateoría de las negociaciones salariales, que explica la determinación del salario y del empleo tomando en cuenta las interacciones estratégicas entre asalariados y empresas. Se muestra que a pesar de las insuficiencias de la microeconomía de las negociaciones, esta teoría renueva en profundidad numerosos campos del análisis macroeconómico. [ger] Die Theorie der Lohnverhandlungen : eine Übersicht über die Fachliteratur, von Pierre Cahuc. Dieser Artikel stellt die jüngsten Entwicklungen in der Theorie der Lohnverhandlungen dar, in der die Lohnbemessung und die Arbeitsbewertung unter Berücksichtigung der strategischen wechselseitigen Beziehungen zwischen den Lohnempfängern und den Betrieben erklärt werden. Er zeigt, dass diese Theorie trotz der Unzulänglichkeiten der auf die Verhandlungen bezogenen mikroökonomischen Untersuchungen zahlreiche Gebiete der makroökonomischen Analyse umfassend erneuert. [fre] La théorie des négociations salariales : Une revue de la littérature, par Pierre Cahuc. Cet article expose les récents développements de la théorie des négociations salariales, qui explique la détermination du salaire et de l'emploi en prenant en considération les interactions stratégiques entre salariés et entreprises. Il montre que malgré les insuffisances de la microéconomie des négociations, cette théorie renouvelle profondément de nombreux champs de l'analyse macroéconomique. [eng] The Theory of Wage Negotiations: a Survey, by Pierre Cahuc. This paper points out the recent developments in the wages negotiation theory which explain how the levels of wages and employment are determined by taking into account strategic interactions between wage earners and firms. Despite the insufficiency of the microeconomics of negotiations, this theory renews many fields of macroeconomic analysis.

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.3406/ecop.1990.5154
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File URL: http://www.persee.fr/doc/ecop_0249-4744_1990_num_92_1_5154
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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Économie & prévision.

Volume (Year): 92 (1990)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 21-30

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Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_1990_num_92_1_5154
Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.1990.5154
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.persee.fr/collection/ecop

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