The Persistence and Indeterminacy of Unemployment in Search Equilibrium
Existing theories that explain persistent and indeterminant unemployment are brought together within the unifying framework of search equilibrium. External economies that exhibit increasing return to production and exchange are identified as potential causes for both the indeterminacy and the persistence of unemployment for a wide range of assumptions about wage determination. Those considered include a "market-clearing" wage, an "efficiency" wage, and an "insider-outsider" wage model. Although either of the non-market-clearing specifications can induce greater persistence, multiple equilibria require increasing returns in the technologies of either production or exchange. Copyright 1989 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
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