How Acid are Lemons? Adverse Selection and Signalling for Skilled Labour Market Entrants
This paper for the first time jointly analyses the consequences of adverse selection, signalling and indices on entry wages of skilled employees. It uses German linked employer employee panel data (LIAB) and introduces a measure for relative productivity of skilled job applicants based on apprenticeship wages. It shows that post-apprenticeship employer changers are a negative selection from the training firms’ point of view. Negative selection leads to lower average wages of employer changers in the first skilled job in comparison to stayers. Entry wages of employer changers are specifically reduced by high occupation and training firm retention rates. High apprenticeship wages signal a positive selection of apprenticeship applicants. Works councils and establishment size seem to be indices for good training quality. Finally, positive individual signals such as schooling background affect the skilled entry wages of employer changers positively.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2012|
|Date of revision:||Feb 2012|
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