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Who Gets the Job and Why? an Explorative Study of Employers'recruitment Behavior

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  • Lars Behrenz

Abstract

In the literature of labor economics we find many examples of studies analyzing job seekers search behavior, but few examples of the corresponding analysis of the recruitment behavior of employers. This paper gives a picture of the recruitment behavior of Swedish employers. The analysis is based on about 800 telephone interviews with employers regarding the last person they had hired. This paper relates the lemon's problem in Akerlof with the Spence signaling model, and then it proceeds to relate indices and signals to the hiring behavior of employers. Employers mainly recruit personnel in order to expand a certain activity of their firm. On an average the total recruitment process takes about a month. In first round employers mainly look for job seekers with good education and experience. During the job interview the employer search for persons with professional knowledge, personal engagement and social competence.

Suggested Citation

  • Lars Behrenz, 2001. "Who Gets the Job and Why? an Explorative Study of Employers'recruitment Behavior," Journal of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(2), pages 255-278, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:recsxx:v:4:y:2001:i:2:p:255-278
    DOI: 10.1080/15140326.2001.12040565
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    Cited by:

    1. Kaniel, Ron & Orlov, Dmitry, 2020. "Intermediated Asymmetric Information, Compensation, and Career Prospects," CEPR Discussion Papers 14586, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Mohrenweiser, Jens & Wydra-Sommaggio, Gaby & Zwick, Thomas, 2014. "Adverse Selection and Information Advantages of Training Firms," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100525, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    3. Calmfors, Lars & Forslund, Anders & Hemström, Maria, 2002. "Does active labour market policy work? Lessons from the Swedish experiences," Working Paper Series 2002:4, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
    4. Jorge M. Streb, 2006. "Job market signals and signs," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 326, Universidad del CEMA.
    5. Michele Pellizzari, 2011. "Employers' Search and the Efficiency of Matching," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 49(1), pages 25-53, March.
    6. Falk, Armin & Lalive, Rafael & Zweimüller, Josef, 2005. "The success of job applications: a new approach to program evaluation," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(6), pages 739-748, December.
    7. Robert Wagner & Thomas Zwick, 2012. "How Acid are Lemons? Adverse Selection and Signalling for Skilled Labour Market Entrants," Economics of Education Working Paper Series 0071, University of Zurich, Department of Business Administration (IBW), revised Feb 2012.
    8. Hensvik, Lena & Nordström Skans, Oskar, 2013. "Networks and youth labor market entry," Working Paper Series 2013:23, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
    9. Jordi Brandts & Arthur Schram & Klarita Gërxhani, 2007. "Information Networks and Worker Recruitment," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 707.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    10. Michèle Forté & Sylvie Monchatre & Géraldine Rieucau & Marie Salognon & Ariel Sevilla & Carole Tuchszirer, 2012. "Pratiques de recrutement et sélectivité sur le marché du travail," Working Papers halshs-00971684, HAL.
    11. Eriksson, Stefan, 2002. "Imperfect information, wage formation, and the employability of the unemployed," Working Paper Series 2002:17, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
    12. Sengul, Gonul, 2017. "Learning about match quality: Information flows and labor market outcomes," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 118-130.
    13. Lars Behrenz, 2002. "The Employment Service and Vacancy Durations," Evaluation Review, , vol. 26(6), pages 602-617, December.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J23 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Demand
    • J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs

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