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Using Employer Hiring Behavior to Test the Educational Signaling Hypothesis

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  • Albrecht, James

    (Georgetown University)

  • van Ours, Jan C.

    (Erasmus University Rotterdam)

Abstract

This paper presents a test of the educational signaling hypothesis. If employers use education as a signal in the hiring process, they will rely more on education when less is otherwise known about applicants. We find that employers are more likely to lower educational standards when an informal, more informative recruitment channel is used, so we conclude that education is used as a signal in the hiring process.

Suggested Citation

  • Albrecht, James & van Ours, Jan C., 2001. "Using Employer Hiring Behavior to Test the Educational Signaling Hypothesis," IZA Discussion Papers 399, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp399
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Barron, John M & Mellow, Wesley, 1982. "Labor Contract Formation, Search Requirements, and Use of a Public Employment Service," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 20(3), pages 381-387, July.
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    10. Lindeboom, Maarten & van Ours, Jan C & Renes, Gusta, 1994. "Matching Employers and Workers: An Empirical Analysis on the Effectiveness of Search," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(1), pages 45-67, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Andrea Weber & Helmut Mahringer, 2008. "Choice and success of job search methods," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 153-178, August.
    2. Inmaculada García-Mainar & Víctor M. Montuenga-Gómez, 2017. "Subjective educational mismatch and signalling in Spain," Documentos de Trabajo dt2017-03, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad de Zaragoza.
    3. Schettkat, Ronald & Yocarini, Lara, 2001. "Education Driving the Rise in Dutch Female Employment: Explanations for the Increase in Part-time Work and Female Employment in the Netherlands, Contrasted with Germany," IZA Discussion Papers 407, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    4. Falk, Armin & Lalive, Rafael & Zweimüller, Josef, 2005. "The success of job applications: a new approach to program evaluation," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(6), pages 739-748, December.
    5. Matthieu Manant & Serge Pajak & Nicolas Soulié, 2019. "Can social media lead to labor market discrimination? Evidence from a field experiment," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(2), pages 225-246, April.
    6. Jeremy Rosen & Alexandre Olbrecht, 2020. "Data‐Driven Drafting: Applying Econometrics To Employ Quarterbacks," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 38(2), pages 313-326, April.
    7. Thomas O. BRODATY & Robert J. GARY-BOBO & Ana PRIETO, 2009. "Does Speed Signal Ability , A Test of Spence's Theory," Working Papers 2009-02, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    8. Oppedisano, Veruska, 2014. "Higher education expansion and unskilled labour market outcomes," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 205-220.
    9. Garcia-Mainar, Inmaculada & Montuenga, Victor M., 2019. "The signalling role of over-education and qualifications mismatch," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 99-119.
    10. Aline Branche-Seigeot, 2013. "La valorisation des compétences de base sur le marché du travail français," Post-Print halshs-00794385, HAL.
    11. Strobl, Eric, 2003. "Is Education Used as a Signaling Device for Productivity in Developing Countries? Evidence from Ghana," IZA Discussion Papers 683, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Recruitment; signaling;

    JEL classification:

    • I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General

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