Apprentice pay in Britain, Germany and Switzerland: institutions, market forces, market power
Although trainee pay is central to the economics of work-based training, institutionalists have paid it little attention, while economists typically assume that it is set by market clearing. We document large differences in the pay of metalworking apprentices in three countries: relative to the pay of skilled employees, it is high in Britain, middling in Germany, and low in Switzerland. Combining fieldwork evidence with national survey data, we associate apprentice pay with both institutional attributes and market forces: specifically, with trade union presence and goals, employer organisation, the contractual status of apprentices, the supply of eligible and interested young people, and public subsidies. Apprentice pay appears to have fallen in Britain and Germany as bargaining coverage has declined.
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- Samuel Muehlemann & Paul Ryan & Stefan C. Wolter, 2013.
"Monopsony Power, Pay Structure, and Training,"
Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 66(5), pages 1097-1114, October.
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- Regina Dionisius & Samuel Muehlemann & Harald Pfeifer & Günter Walden & Felix Wenzelmann & Stefan C. Wolter, 2009. "Costs and Benefits of Apprenticeship Training. A Comparison of Germany and Switzerland," Applied Economics Quarterly (formerly: Konjunkturpolitik), Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, vol. 55(1), pages 7-37.
- Dionisius, Regina & Mühlemann, Samuel & Pfeifer, Harald & Walden, Günter & Wenzelmann, Felix & Wolter, Stefan C., 2008. "Cost and Benefit of Apprenticeship Training: A Comparison of Germany and Switzerland," IZA Discussion Papers 3465, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Regina Dionisius & Samuel Muehlemann & Harald Pfeifer & Günter Walden & Felix Wenzelmann & Stefan C. Wolter, 2008. "Cost and Benefit of Apprenticeship Training – A Comparison of Germany and Switzerland," CESifo Working Paper Series 2287, CESifo Group Munich.
- Addison, John T. & Bryson, Alex & Teixeira, Paulino & Pahnke, André & Bellmann, Lutz, 2010. "The State of Collective Bargaining and Worker Representation in Germany: The Erosion Continues," IZA Discussion Papers 5030, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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