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Incentive Contracts

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  • Edward P. Lazear

Abstract

Labor relations involve incentive problems. The market solves these problems by developing a variety of institutions. This paper describes and assesses the various forms of incentive contracts.

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File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w1917.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 1917.

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Date of creation: May 1986
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Publication status: published as The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics. vol.2,pp. 744-748, ed. John Eatwell, Murray Milgate and Peter Newman. The Macmillan Press Limited London, 1987
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:1917

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Maes, Marjan, 2008. "Does the dismantlement of early retirement schemes increase unemployment in Belgium?," Working Papers, Hogeschool-Universiteit Brussel, Faculteit Economie en Management 2008/57, Hogeschool-Universiteit Brussel, Faculteit Economie en Management.
  2. Gary Burtless & Alicia H. Munnell, 1990. "Does a trend toward early retirement create problems for the economy?," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Nov, pages 17-32.
  3. Alexandros Karakostas & Axel Sonntag & Daniel John Zizzo, 2013. "Efficiency and Fairness in Revenue Sharing Contracts," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 13-03, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  4. Harvey S. James Jr., 1997. "A Legal Basis for Workers as Agents: Employment Contracts, Common Law, and the Theory of the Firm," Law and Economics, EconWPA 9705001, EconWPA, revised 04 Feb 2002.
  5. Erling Barth & Bernt Bratsberg & Torbjørn Hægeland & Oddbjørn Raaum, 2008. "Who pays for performance?," International Journal of Manpower, Emerald Group Publishing, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 29(1), pages 8-29, May.

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