IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/revind/v45y2014i3p221-243.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Increasing the Efficiency of Spectrum Allocation

Author

Listed:
  • Gregory Rosston

Abstract

Over the past 80 years, the Federal Communications Commission has been responsible for the allocation of non-governmental use of the radio frequency spectrum. Over that time, here have been significant changes in spectrum use that have been driven by changes in demand and technology. The technical, regulatory, and business obstacles in past reallocations shed light on some of the FCC’s implementation decisions for its upcoming two-sided auction. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Suggested Citation

  • Gregory Rosston, 2014. "Increasing the Efficiency of Spectrum Allocation," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 45(3), pages 221-243, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:45:y:2014:i:3:p:221-243
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-014-9431-2
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11151-014-9431-2
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11151-014-9431-2?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paul Milgrom, 2011. "Critical Issues In The Practice Of Market Design," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 49(2), pages 311-320, April.
    2. Bazelon, Coleman, 2009. "Too many goals: Problems with the 700Â MHz auction," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 115-127, June.
    3. Cramton, Peter & Kwerel, Evan & Williams, John, 1998. "Efficient Relocation of Spectrum Incumbents," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 647-675, October.
    4. Kwerel, Evan R & Rosston, Gregory L, 2000. "An Insiders' View of FCC Spectrum Auctions," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 253-289, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Michelle Connolly & Nelson Sa & Azeem Zaman & Chris Roark & Akshaya Trivedi, 2018. "The Evolution of U.S. Spectrum Values Over Time," Working Papers 121, Brandeis University, Department of Economics and International Business School.
    2. Rosston, Gregory L. & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2021. "Reclaiming spectrum from incumbents in inefficiently allocated bands: Transaction costs, competition, and flexibility," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(7).
    3. O. Carare & E. Kiselev & W. Leighton & J. Levy & K. LoPiccalo & P. Sanyal & T. Waldon, 2016. "Economics at the FCC, 2015–2016: Competition, Merger Review, and Spectrum Management," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 49(4), pages 557-584, December.
    4. Blumrosen, Liad & Solan, Eilon, 2023. "Selling spectrum in the presence of shared networks: The case of the Israeli 5G auction," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 47(2).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Thomas W. Hazlett & David Porter & Vernon Smith, 2011. "Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Ronald Coase," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(S4), pages 125-165.
    2. Peter Cramton & Evan Kwerel & Gregory Rosston & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2011. "Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(S4), pages 167-188.
    3. Lawrence White, 2000. ""Propertyzing" the Electromagnetic Spectrum: Why It's Important, and How to Begin," Working Papers 00-08, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    4. Evan Kwerel & Paroma Sanyal & Katja Seim & Martha Stancill & Patrick Sun, 2017. "Economics at the FCC, 2016–2017: Auction Designs for Spectrum Repurposing and Universal Service Subsidies," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 51(4), pages 451-486, December.
    5. Peter Cramton, 2002. "Spectrum Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 01hte, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 16 Jul 2001.
    6. Saint, Martin & Brown, Timothy X, 2019. "A dynamic policy license for flexible spectrum management," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 23-37.
    7. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Crampton & Paul Milgrom, 2004. "The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design," Discussion Papers 03-034, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    8. Bazelon, Coleman & McHenry, Giulia, 2013. "Spectrum value," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(9), pages 737-747.
    9. Peter Cramton, 2013. "Spectrum Auction Design," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 42(2), pages 161-190, March.
    10. Kazumori, Eiichiro & Belch, Yaakov, 2019. "t-Tree: The Tokyo toolbox for large-scale combinatorial auction experiments," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(C).
    11. Glass, Victor & Tardiff, Timothy, 2019. "The Federal Communications Commission's rural infrastructure auction: What is hidden in the weeds?," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(8), pages 1-1.
    12. Gary Madden & Erik Bohlin & Paitoon Kraipornsak & Thien Tran, 2014. "The determinants of prices in the FCC's 700 MHz spectrum auction," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 46(17), pages 1953-1960, June.
    13. Evan Kwerel & Johathan Levy & Robert Pepper & David Sappington & Donald Stockdale & John Williams, 2002. "Economic Issues at the Federal Communications Commission," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 21(4), pages 337-356, December.
    14. Manjunath, Vikram & Westkamp, Alexander, 2021. "Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    15. Ajay Agrawal & John Horton & Nicola Lacetera & Elizabeth Lyons, 2015. "Digitization and the Contract Labor Market: A Research Agenda," NBER Chapters, in: Economic Analysis of the Digital Economy, pages 219-250, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Thomas W. Hazlett & Joshua D. Wright, 2017. "The Effect of Regulation on Broadband Markets: Evaluating the Empirical Evidence in the FCC’s 2015 “Open Internet” Order," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 50(4), pages 487-507, June.
    17. Joshua S. Gans & Stephen P. King & Julian Wright, 2005. "Wireless Communications," Monash Economics Working Papers archive-45, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    18. Shengwu Li, 2017. "Ethics and market design," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 33(4), pages 705-720.
    19. Gary Madden & Hiroaki Suenaga, 2017. "The determinants of price in 3G spectrum auctions," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(32), pages 3129-3140, July.
    20. Henriques, David, 2023. "A combinatorial auction to sell TV broadcasting rights in league sports," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 47(6).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:45:y:2014:i:3:p:221-243. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.