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Spectrum value

Author

Listed:
  • Bazelon, Coleman
  • McHenry, Giulia

Abstract

Radio spectrum is a scarce resource; understanding its economic value is one piece of information needed to manage it efficiently. Estimating the value of radio spectrum, however, creates significant challenges not found in valuing some other assets. Spectrum is somewhat of a special case; market transactions provide a basis for valuation, but almost always require significant adjustments. Some adjustments are best made using discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis or econometric evidence. A review of past work on spectrum valuations suggests that focusing on a single valuation technique leaves critical information about spectrum value unused.

Suggested Citation

  • Bazelon, Coleman & McHenry, Giulia, 2013. "Spectrum value," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(9), pages 737-747.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:telpol:v:37:y:2013:i:9:p:737-747
    DOI: 10.1016/j.telpol.2013.06.004
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bazelon, Coleman, 2009. "Too many goals: Problems with the 700Â MHz auction," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 115-127, June.
    2. Thomas W. Hazlett & Roberto E. Muñoz, 2009. "A welfare analysis of spectrum allocation policies," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(3), pages 424-454, September.
    3. Cramton Peter & Schwartz Jesse A, 2002. "Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-20, December.
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